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Questioning the Marriage Assumptions:
The Justifications for "Opposite-Sex Only"
Marriage as Support for the Abolition of
Marriage
Summer L. Nastich*

INTRODUCTION
The controversy of marriage is everywhere these days. Some
same-sex couples obviously desire the right to marry.' Some feel
opposite-sex 2 couples should continue to possess exclusive access to
* Summer L. Nastich, J.D. expected 2003, Boston University School of Law. The
author wishes to thank the staff and editorial board of Law & Inequality, especially
Geoffrey S. Trotier and Dorothy M. Gause for their wonderfully thoughtful and
meticulous editorial work. The author would also like to thank Catherine E. Bailly
and Diane R. Smith for their contributions to earlier drafts of this Article; Professor
Robert Volk for his comments, criticisms and support; Professor Oona A. Hathaway
for her encouragement and contribution to the shape of this Article; and, Professor
Stanley Z. Fisher for his guidance and mentorship. None of these individuals or
organizations necessarily shares the views or opinions of the author.
1. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867-68 (Vt. 1999) ("Plaintiffs [were]
three same-sex couples who [had] lived together in committed relationships for
periods ranging from four to twenty-five years .... ) Each couple was refused a
marriage license because the applicable state marriage laws only allowed marriage
licenses for opposite-sex couples. Id.
2. The author adopts the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.11 (Haw. 1993). The Baehr court appears to view
"homosexual" and "heterosexual" as describing the nature of a person, as opposed
to a person's ability or inability to marry. See id. Therefore, "[p]arties to a 'union
between a man and a woman' may or may not be homosexuals." Id. By the same
reasoning, "[plarties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either
homosexuals or heterosexuals." Id. That an individual is married, therefore, does
not mean the individual is heterosexual. The Baehr court went on to adopt
definitions of "homosexual" and "heterosexual" that focus on sexual attraction and
the gender of the people to whom an individual is sexually attracted. Id. In this
Article, however, the author adopts definitions of "homosexual" and "heterosexual"
that focus on emotion, as opposed to sexual attraction. Thus, individuals who tend
to fall in love with members of the same sex are "homosexual" and individuals who
tend to fall in love with members of the opposite sex are "heterosexual." Similarly,
"bisexual" individuals are those who fall in love with members of both sexes. The
author selected these definitions not only for their accuracy, but to highlight the
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marriage. 3 Some commentators publish articles suggesting ways
Congress passed a law
the President should promote it. 4
purporting to define marriage.5 The Bush Administration's 2003
budget proposal included a $100 million attempt to induce women
on welfare to enter into it. 6 Tracing these facts backwards leads to
an assumption: Marriage is a good thing.7 This Article questions
the validity of that assumption.
Additionally, this Article argues that the justifications offered
in support of marriage as a purely opposite-sex institution actually
This Article also argues that
support marriage's abolition.
elimination of the legal institution of marriage would accomplish
the social goals and objectives of marriage more successfully than
marriage currently does. Thus, by abolishing marriage, society
point that individuals who engage in sexual relations exclusively with members of
the opposite sex may, in fact, be homosexual, just as individuals who only engage in
sexual relations with members of the same sex may, in fact, be heterosexual.
3. Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our Final Answer?, 14 NOTRE DAME
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 729, 751-52 (2000) ("[M]arriage is a unique type of
friendship, specified by the capacity to engage in reproductive type acts, which is
simply unavailable to same-sex couples.").
4. David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage: A
PresidentialPriority, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 623, 643-51 (2001). Coolidge and
Duncan urge the President to promote opposite-sex marriage in general, as well as
marriage as an exclusively opposite-sex institution. See id. To do so, Coolidge and
Duncan suggest the following: (1) appointing "[jiudges who believe that marriage
requires a man and a woman"; (2) creating "a federal constitutional amendment
defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman"; (3) supporting the
policy of the Boy Scouts in not allowing gay troop leaders and thereby "stand[ing]
up for the right of Americans to associate for the well-being of youth in an
organization that promotes traditional sexual morality"; (4) interpreting "sexual
orientation" in such a way that any law including the term "preserves the
distinction between married couples and unmarried persons, and upholds the right
of private organizations to support this view of marriage in their programs"; (5)
"instruct[ing] the Internal Revenue Service not to accept tax returns that attempt
to use Vermont 'civil unions' as a basis for claiming marital status or its
equivalent"; and (6) "mak[ing] it clear to all countries and international bodies that
the official position of the United States is that marriage is the union of a man and
a woman. Id. Therefore, federal law will not give marital status or its equivalent
to same-sex couples, regardless of the law of another country." Id. Thus, Coolidge
and Duncan claim that "[b]y setting legislative, regulatory and funding priorities
for his Administration, and taking advantage of the ever-present 'bully pulpit,'
President Bush can certainly do much to promote marriage." Id. at 624.
5. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
6. See Charity Vogel, Family Matters; PresidentBush Has a Proposalfor Single
Mothers on Welfare: Marry the Fathersof Your Children and Get FederalDollars.
But Few Are Falling Head over Heels for the Idea, BUFF. NEWS, February 7, 2002,
at Al, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.
7. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 2
(2000) ("From the founding of the United States to the present day, assumptions
about the importance of marriage and its appropriate form have been deeply
implanted in public policy....").
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8
would reap significant social benefits.
While this Article addresses arguments made in support of
the perpetuation of marriage as a purely opposite-sex institution,
this is not an article in favor of same-sex marriage. Although a
number of the arguments, analyses, and examples contained
within support same-sex marriage by countering arguments made
in opposition to such marriages, legal recognition of same-sex
marriage is not the objective of the argument below. The intent of
this Article is to show that while limiting legal marriage to
opposite-sex couples is completely unjustifiable, marriage itself is
unjustifiable - whether opposite-sex, same-sex, or both - albeit
less so than the perpetuation of marriage as a purely opposite-sex
institution.

1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA
A. EARLY AMERICA CONTINUING THE ENGLISH
IDEAL
In colonizing the New World, Europeans held and
perpetuated Christian marital ideals. 9 The European concept
considered marriage an Earthly representation of Christian
divinity and social order. 10 As God's rule over man was a foregone
conclusion, so too was the rule of kings over subjects and husbands
over wives.1 1 So complete was this rule, that the law treated
women as completely absorbed into their husbands. 12 In marriage,
women surrendered not only their property, but the very right to

8. This Article neither advocates for the abolition of religious, spiritual, or
cultural ceremonies, traditions, or doctrines nor argues against commitment
ceremonies. This Article does not champion a less committed society, nor does it
support polygamy, polygyny or any other form of plural legal institution. This
Article suggests only that the legal institution of marriage - as it currently exists
in the United States with all of its concomitant rights, obligations, benefits, and
privileges - should be abolished for the reasons given.
9. See generally COTT, supra note 7, at 9-10 (noting that the Christian marital
ideal is a permanent, monogamous, opposite-sex union).
10. See JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION,
AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 131 (1997). This structure "helped to

substantiate the traditional hierarchies of husband over wife, parent over child,
church over household, state over church, and to integrate the sundry biblical
duties that attached to each of these offices." Id.
11. Id.
12. See Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Ex'rs, 96 S.E. 315, 316 (Va. 1918) (finding
that Virginia's married women's statute did not alter the common law of the day, as
the statute did not confer upon married women the substantive civil right of a legal
existence and legal personality separate and apart from that of the husband).
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13
hold it at all.
Historically, American common law reflects this marital
structure as a trade of sorts. 14 Husbands bore responsibility for
feeding, housing, clothing, and otherwise providing for the wife
and any children.' 5 In return, wives owed their husbands the
16
performance of all domestic duties, fulfillment of sexual desires,
conversion to the husband of any and all property possessed by the
17
wife as a single woman, and surrender of the right of possession.
While wives remained decidedly subordinate to their
husbands, American revolutionaries took a different view of
marriage than their European ancestors. Some Americans saw
marriage more as a contract between two parties.' 8 Husbands had

13. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the married women's
acts of the late 1800s to the mid- 1900s that changed this point of law).
14. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?,9 VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 239,
247 n.23 (2001) (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY (1981)). "Wives owed husbands their sexual and domestic services and,
in exchange, their husbands were required to provide for them economically." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. From the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, most states passed some form of
married women's act. These acts allowed women to remain seized of property held
prior to marriage and acquire exclusive title to additional property during the
marriage. See, e.g., An Act To Secure To Married Women Their Rights In Property,
1844 Me. Laws 117, construed in Southard v. Plummer, 36 Me. 64, 64-66 (1853). At
"common law the husband has a freehold estate in the real property of the wife,
and the use and control of it, and by the marriage the title to personal chattels in
her possession passes to him." Id. at 69-70. Under § 2 of the Act, however, the
"right of [wives in] property and control over it should remain, not only against the
creditors and contracts of the husband, but against the husband himself." Id. at 70.
Tennessee's, "A Bill For An Act To Be Entitled 'An Act To Remove Disabilities Of
Coverture From Married Women, And To Repeal All Acts And Parts Of Acts In
Conflict With The Provisions Of This Act' states:
[M]arriage shall not impose any disability or incapacity on a woman as to
the ownership, acquisition, or disposition of property of any sort, or as to
her capacity to make contracts and do all acts in reference to property
which she could lawfully do if she were not married; but every woman now
married, or hereafter to be married, shall have the same capacity to
acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy, and dispose of, all property, real
and personal, in possession, and to make any contract in reference to it,
and to bind herself personally, and to sue and be sued with all the rights
and incidents thereof, as if she were not married.
1913 Tenn. Pub. Acts 26, quoted in Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 179 S.W. 628, 628-29
(Tenn. 1915).
18. See generally Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 600
(1819) The defendant's attorney argued the implications of U.S. CONST. art. I § 10
with respect to various types of contracts, stating "marriage is a contract, and a
private contract; but relating merely to a matter of civil institution.... See id.
Therefore, if either party breached the agreement, the other could terminate it.
See, e.g., Inhabitants of Milford v. Inhabitants of Worcester, 7 Mass. (1 Tyng) 48, 51
(1810) (implying that while the nature of a marriage contract is permanent, the
contract may be "dissolved for causes which defeat the object of marriage").
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power and control over their wives because their wives gave it of
their own free will. 19 The old European model of marriage
paralleled the social and political structure of the monarchies of
Europe.
Similarly, the American construction paralleled the
political and social thought of the nascent democracy. 20
B. MARRIAGE AND RACE IN THE YOUNG
DEMOCRACY
Even though early Americans considered marriage important
for individuals and the State alike, 21 they also felt some situations
warranted exception. The very young United States did not
consider slaves "people of the United States."2 2 As only "people of
the United States" had legal rights, slaves had none. 23 Therefore,
slaves could not enter into legal marriages. 24
Originally, the requirements for dissolution of the marital union were fairly rigid.
See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage As Contract, Opportunistic
Violence, And Other Bad Arguments For Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719,
722-23 (1997) (describing the shift from the "full-fault" law of divorce first used in
most states, to the adoption by every state of "part-fault" or "no-fault' divorces).
These requirements, however, lessened and changed as the needs and perceptions
of society changed and grew. Id.
19. See Co'r, supra note 7, at 16-17.
20. See id. In the European system, husbands were analogous to kings, and
wives the loyal subjects. Id. In the American system, husbands were analogous to
elected officials whose power derived from election by the people. Id. Wives,
therefore, were analogous to the people. Id. Thus, husbands headed families as
elected officials headed the state, with and because of consent given in the form of
marriage and election, respectively. Id.
21. See id. at 32.
22. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856) (finding that slaves and
their descendants could not be classified as "people of the United States" because
the Framers considered them "a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had
been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, remained
subject to their authority.").
23. Id. at 403 (finding that Dred Scott, as a slave descended from Africans who
were brought to America in a condition of slavery, was not a "person of the United
States"). Scott "had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power
and the Government might choose to grant [him]." Id. at 405.
24. Id. at 599. "If, in Missouri, [Scott] were held to be a slave, the validity and
operation of his contract of marriage must be denied. He can have no legal rights;
of course, not those of a husband and father." Id. Accord State v. Samuel, 19 N.C.
177, 182 (1836) ("[T]he marriage of slaves, then, is wholly pretermitted, and hence
a legal marriage cannot be contracted between them."). Slaves were unable to
enter into any contract including those for marriage "upon the presumption of the
want of free consent, and upon the further ground of the difficulty of giving legal
validity to the marriage, in respect to its most important legal incidents, without
essentially curtailing the rights and powers of the masters." Id. Consideration of
the psychological and emotional impact upon any given group that results from
systematically and institutionally denying them entrance into a coveted social class
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that "[tlhe denial of
legal marriage to slaves quintessentially expressed their lack of civil rights." Corr,
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After the Civil War, most states permitted and recognized
intra-racial marriages between former slaves. 25
Inter-racial
marriages between "White" 26 individuals and "Black" individuals,
however, were illegal and even criminalized until the Supreme
27
Court struck down all such statutes in Loving v. Virginia.
Interestingly, the federal government gave marriages
between Native Americans and "White" individuals considerably
different treatment. 28 Federal policy reflected that marriage was
an excellent tool for the assimilation and "civilization" of Native
Americans. 29 The federal government also benefited from such
marriages because they encouraged the married Native American
individual to sever his or her ties to the tribe.3 0 In this way,
interracial marriages between Native Americans and "White"
individuals smoothed the expansion of the Union into formerly

supra note 7, at 33. Certainly, the experience of modern Gay-Lesbian-BisexualTransgendered ('GLBT") individuals does not equal a condition of slavery, yet the
inability of gay, lesbian, and in some cases, transgendered and bisexual people to
marry the person they love is a constant reminder of their status as second-class
human beings.
25. See Ferrall v. Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60, 61 (N.C. 1910) (implying that under North
Carolina law in 1910, while "Black" individuals could marry each other, "Black"
individuals could not marry "White" individuals).
26. The social and legal construct of "separate but equal" created the need to
define the terms "White" and "Colored" employed in that period. As an example, in
Wall v. Oyster, the D.C. Circuit adopted the reasoning and definitions provided by
the lower court that:
Actual color seems to the public mind to be important only as one of the
several evidences which, if sufficiently pronounced, serve to identify the
subject as of the negro race; and this consideration, that is to say, the
consideration of racial status, seems to my mind to measure an ultimate
conception to which the mind of the people has arrived. It is this, - putting
away for the moment particular instances which might present more
refined complications, - persons of whatever complexion, who bear negro
blood in whatever degree, and who abide in the racial status of the negro,
are "colored" in the common estimation of the people.
36 App. D.C. 50, 55-56 (1910).
While the passage above may over-simplify the point, it illustrates that racial
identity is a complex and difficult issue. After much consideration, and in an
attempt to use the least offensive but most accurate terms available, the author
placed the words "White" and "Black" in quotations. The author also selected the
term "Native American" to describe individuals indigenous to the area currently
rncompassed by the boundary of the United States and their descendants. The
author hopes this will allow for a clear conveyance of ideas without connotation,
and that this course of action is not racially insensitive.
27. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Under our Constitution, the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.").
28. See CoTTr, supra note 7, at 27.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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Native American lands.3 1 However, state governments had the
final say in marriage. 32 Despite federal encouragement of the
practice, many states nullified marriages between Native
33
Americans and "White" individuals by statute.
C. THE INFLUENCE OF SUFFERAGE
The women's sufferage movement also shaped the contours of
American marriage. 34 Women's rights advocates felt that women
could never achieve equality if they were obliged to surrender their
property and their bodies to their husbands. 35 Eventually, the
natural progression of this thinking caused the steady and
continual social revolution that ultimately ended coverture,
secured women the vote, required equal pay for equal work, and
brought husbands and wives closer to equality within their
marriages and men and women closer to equality in the greater
36
arena of society.
II. MARRIAGE DEFINED?
A. STRUGGLING FOR A DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE
Considering the extent and variety of material written on the
subject, finding an acceptable definition of marriage is surprisingly
difficult. 37 While even the staunchest supporters of marriage
admit the need for a clear definition,38 they too are unable to agree
31. See id.
32. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) ("[T]he state's monopoly on
the business of marriage creations has been codified by statute for more than a
century.").
33. See COTT, supra note 7, at 27-28.
34. See id. at 63.
35. See id. at 64-67.
36. See id. at 156-68 (describing the effect of sufferage on marriage and the
position of women in society in general).
37. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 14, at 242.
Marriage has various meanings to individuals entering into it. Marriage
can be experienced as: a legal tie, a symbol of commitment, a privileged
sexual affiliation, a relationship of hierarchy and subordination, a means
of self-fulfillment, a societal construct, a cultural phenomenon, a religious
mandate, an economic relationship, a preferred reproductive unit. A way
to ensure against poverty and dependency, a romantic ideal, a natural or
divined connection, a stand-in for morality, a status, or a contractual
relationship.

Id.
38. See Lynn D. Wardle, 'Multiply and Replenish" Considering Same-Sex
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation,24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 771, 780 (2001) [hereinafter Multiply and Replenish]. "Marriage is of such
profound importance to society that there is great danger if its meaning and
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upon a single meaning. For example, Gerard V. Bradley posits
that a legal marriage does not exist until the would-be spouses
perform the act of genital consummation, even if all other
elements of a marriage are present and the participants satisfy all
of the legal requirements. 39 On the other hand, Professor Lynn D.
Wardle, claims, "the integrations of the universe of gender
differences (profound and subtle, biological and cultural,
psychological and genetic) associated with sexual identity
constitutes the core and essence of marriage. The heterosexual
dimensions of the relationship are at the very core of what makes
'marriage' what it is."40 Exactly what it is that this makes
marriage, however, remains unclear.
Congress embodied its attempt in the Defense of Marriage
Act ("DOMA").4 1 This legislation stated that .'[m]arriage' means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 42 Black's Law Dictionary
defines marriage as:
[T]he civil status or relationship existing between a man and a
woman who agree to and do live together as spouses. The
essentials of a valid marriage are (1) parties legally capable of
contracting marriage, (2) mutual consent or agreement,
and
43
(3) an actual contracting in the form prescribed by law.
Black's third subsection accentuates the point that marriage laws
may differ in each state. Therefore, to be clear about what one
means by "marriage," one must specify the particular state law
used to define the marital "status or relationship."
Some scholars claim that "[m]arriage is the joining of the two
44
sexes into a community that connects the generations."
However, these scholars fail to explain exactly how this connection
between the generations occurs. 45 These same scholars further
definition become ambiguous." Id.
39. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 749. "Nothing less (or more) than an act of
genital union consummates a marriage; and such an act consummates even if it is
not particularly pleasurable." Id. Under this definition, a union between one man
and one woman is not a marriage until the man and woman engage in genital sex.

Id.

40. Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage:Efforts to Legitimate a
Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 748 (1998)
[hereinafter Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage].
41. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
42. Id.
43. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 986 (7th ed. 1999).
44. Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 4, at 639.
45. Id. at 638-51.
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claim that if members of society believe that marriage creates a
community that is "the general ideal for society,"46 and "the
central social institution that brings men, women and children
together," then they should have a right to support marriage in
public policy. 47 However, they never reveal how or why this is so
for marriage, but not for other forms of unions. Ironically, these
scholars state that if marriage does not achieve these goals, then
society should "simply abolish [marriage] and let people create
4
their own contracts." 8
1. THE TRANSEXUAL CURVEBALL
The issue of transexualism further complicates the issue.
The available marital definitions do not address the issue of a
committed, monogamous, sexual union between a transexual
individual and another individual, transexual or otherwise. 49 The
status of transexual relationships remains questionable, even after
these individuals perform all of the requirements for entrance into
legal marriage.
In Littleton v. Prange,50 Lee Cavazos, Jr., born an anatomical
male, underwent sex reassignment surgery so that her body would
reflect what she felt was her true female gender.5 1 Having
changed her name to "Christie," she later married Jonathon
Littleton under the laws of Kentucky. 52 The two lived as husband

46. Id. at 635.
47. Id. at 638.
48. Id. at 639. See infra notes 283-291 and accompanying text for a discussion of
replacing marriage with contracts.
49. See, e.g., In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio
Misc. 1997) The court refused to grant the transgendered petitioner a license to
marry a man. "There was no evidence that the applicant at birth had any physical
characteristics other than those of a male and he was thus correctly designated
'Boy' on his birth certificate. There also was no laboratory documentation that the
applicant had other than male chromosomes." Id. Accord Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. 4th 1999), cert. denied 531 U.S. 872 (2000); M.T. v.J.T.,
355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. 1976), cert. denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976)
(finding that a post-operative transexual could enter into a valid marriage with an
individual who is of the opposite sex at the time of the marriage); cf. In re Estate of
Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. App. 2001) affd in part, rev'd in part, 42 P.3d
120, 137 (Kan. 2002). The court rejected the reasoning of the Littleton majority as
"a rigid and simplistic approach to issues that are far more complex than addressed
in that opinion," and concluded that "a trial court must consider and decide
whether an individual was male or female at the time the individual's marriage
license was issued and the individual was married, not simply what the
individual's chromosomes were or were not at the moment of birth." Id.
50. 9 S.W.3d at 223.
51. Id. at 224.
52. Id. at 224-25.
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and wife until Jonathon's death seven years later. 53 As a result of
Jonathon's death, Christie filed an action for medical malpractice
"under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statute in her
capacity as Jonathon's surviving spouse." 54 The defendant in the
suit moved for summary judgment, asserting that "Christie is a
man and cannot be the surviving spouse of another man."5 5 Even
though the trial court found that "[slome physicians would
consider Christie a female; other physicians would consider her
still a male," the court apparently found no question of material
fact existed in the case. 56 The Appeals Court of Texas affirmed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. 57 In so doing, the Appeals Court concluded "as a
matter of law, that Christie Littleton is a male."5 8 Further, the
court stated, "As a male, Christie cannot be married to another
male." 59 The court thus held that Christie's marriage to Jonathon
was invalid, and that she could not bring a cause of action as his
60
surviving spouse.
The Appeals Court affirmed summary judgment against
Christie Littleton despite finding that Christie and Jonathon
Littleton performed all of the requirements of marriage under
Kentucky law. 6 1 Christie and Jonathon Littleton lived together as
man and wife for seven years. 62 According to medical science,
there are "individuals whose sexual self-identity is in conflict with
their biological and anatomical sex," and Christie Littleton was
one such person. 63 As the court noted, "Christie Littleton made
every conceivable effort to make herself a female, including a
surgery that would make most males pale and perspire to
Also, Christie Littleton amended her birth
contemplate." 64
certificate so that it would reflect her gender and the current state
of her body. 65 Littleton may raise more questions than it answers.
The court identified one such question, 'When is a man a man,

53. Id at 225.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 231.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 225.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id. at 230-31.
65. Id. at 231.
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and when is a woman a woman?" 66 As this question remains
unanswered, perhaps unanswerable, 67 using gender to define
marriage does little to advance our understanding of what
"marriage" actually means.
B. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE LACK OFA
CLEAR DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE
Marriage, even if inconsistently defined, exists with
numerous benefits, both tangible 6 and intangible, 69 as well as
various obligations. 70 If society wishes to distribute these benefits
only to individuals who obtain a particular status, but that status
is undefined, then the distribution of benefits is most likely underand over-inclusive.
Consider the hypothetical scenario of a childless couple
consisting of a biological man and a biological woman married
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 71 The
relationship fails, and the wife moves out. The couple lives
separate lives but do not divorce because the wife works for a
small company with no health insurance for its employees, and she
cannot afford an individual plan. As a married individual,
however, she is covered under her husband's plan as a benefit of
his employment. Additionally, their marital status confers upon
them significantly lower insurance rates on the car the husband
uses to get to and from work. They both begin to see other people.
Under DOMA, the couple is married and entitled to all of the
66. Id. at 223.
67. "On its surface, the question of whether a person is male or female seems
simple enough. Complicated with the issues of surgical alteration, sexual identity,
and same-sex marriage, the answer is not so simple." Id. at 233 (Lopez, J.,
dissenting).
68. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, GAO/OGC-9716, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 1-2 (1997) (listing 1049 laws in the United States
Code in which marital status is a factor) [hereinafter GAO Report]. For example,
preferential treatment is given under the federal income tax system, spousal death
benefits, and employment benefits. See id. See also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
883-84 (Vt. 1999) (citing numerous Vermont statutes that benefit and protect
married couples, such as the right to make emergency medical decisions for an
incapacitated spouse, marital testimonial privilege, and receipt of a share of the
spouse's estate should the spouse die intestate). See infra note 280.
69. Some examples are not having to dread answering questions from nosy
relatives as to why one is still unmarried at age thirty, satisfying the expectation of
parents that their child will marry, the additional financial security incurred
through marriage, and knowing there are legal deterrents to one's partner
throwing some underwear in a bag, starting the car, and making a break for it.
70. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 68 (noting the tax policy issue, "the socalled marriage penalty").
71. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 207 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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benefits this status confers. 72 This conflicts with the definition in
Black's Law Dictionary however, because the couple is not "liv[ing]
together as spouses." 73 Additionally, this "marriage" neither
connects generations,7 4 nor, with the possible exception of the
75
financial collusion, "brings men, women and children together."
As a second hypothetical example, consider a biological man
and a biological woman living together for fifteen years, yet not
married under the laws of any state. The couple has a child, in
addition to one child each from prior relationships. All the
children are treated equally and raised as a family. According to
both Congress 7 6 and Black's, 77 the couple is not married and
therefore not entitled to the rights, privileges, and protections
afforded married couples.
This second hypothetical family, while not headed by a
creating
inter-generational
legally
married
couple,
is
connections. 78 This family is "bring[ing] men, women and children
together," a benefit "opposite-sex only" marriage advocates claim
marriage provides.7 9 Yet a state may be able to force this couple
and their children out of a home they own via zoning ordinances.8 0
The members of this couple may not be entitled to coverage under
81
each other's employer offered health insurance plans.

72. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
73.See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43.
74. See Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 4, at 639. See also supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.
75. See Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 4, at 638. See also supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.
76. Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419.
77. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
78. See Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 4, at 639 and accompanying text. See also
supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
79. See Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 4, at 638 and accompanying text. See also
supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
80. See City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. App. 1986) (holding that the
zoning ordinance upon which the city of Ladue relied to enjoin the defendants from
occupying the home they jointly owned was not unconstitutional). The defendants
in Horn were two unmarried adults with three children between them from prior
relationships. Id. at 747. The defendants shared a bedroom, maintained a joint
checking account, ate together, and disciplined each other's children. Id. The
zoning ordinance in question classified the area in which the home was located as
"one family residential." Id. The ordinance defined "family" as "one or more
persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, occupying a dwelling unit as an
individual housekeeping organization." Id. Because defendants did not fit this
definition of "family," the city said they could not occupy any house in the one
family zone. Id.
81. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
Chicago Board of Education was not obliged to provide the same domestic partner
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Additionally, some states deny such couples "hospital visitation
and other medical decision making privileges." 82 As shown in the
discussion that follows, the denial of these rights and benefits to
unmarried couples is unjustifiable.
In response to the second hypothetical couple above, some
might wonder why they do not choose the marriage option. The
answer to the question is irrelevant. Financial or social pressures
should not force couples into marriage. As the above examples
demonstrate, however, this coercion is exactly the result of the
current legal institution of marriage.
III. SOCIAL DISPARITIES CREATED BY MARRIAGE AND
THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF BENEFITS
DISTRIBUTION VIA MARRIAGE
The following refutation of the ostensible justifications for
"opposite-sex only" marriage will demonstrate how these
justifications fail to achieve their intended purpose. In turn, this
failure leads to a series of conclusions. Initially, it is unjustifiable
to exclusively recognize opposite-sex unions as marriages. Next,
the current American legal institution of marriage itself is
unjustifiable, as is the distribution of privileges, benefits, and
protections according to marital status. Additionally, marriage
fails to achieve the goals and objectives cited as justification for
Therefore, if
limiting legal marriage to opposite-sex couples.
society truly needs and intends to achieve those goals and
objectives, then society should abolish marriage and enact a
system that will successfully achieve them.
The abolition of marriage - and replacement thereof with an
alternative system for achieving the stated social goals and
objectives of marriage - would also eliminate the social and
economic inequality perpetuated by marriage. Thus, the abolition
of marriage would not only accomplish the social goals and
objectives of marriage that currently are lacking, but would also
create a more equal and just society.
A. DO NOT ASK TO WHOM THE BENEFITS FLOWTHEY FLOW TO THEE
In connection with DOMA's enactment, Congress asked the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") to "identify federal laws in
benefits to unmarried employees in committed opposite-sex relationships that it
provided to employees in committed same-sex relationships).
82. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999).
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which benefits, rights and privileges are contingent on marital
status."8 3 More than three months after President Clinton signed
84
In its
DOMA into law, the GAO reported back to Congress.
the
United
to
classified
laws
search, the GAO found "1049 federal
85
States Code in which marital status is a factor." The GAO only
addressed marital status impacting individuals under federal
law.8 6 The GAO report does not address, and does not relate to,
the interplay between marital status and the laws of each
individual state.8 7 What the GAO report does show, however, is
that the way in which many federal laws affect an individual is
dependant upon the individual's marital status. 88 Moreover, far
more often than not, the law treats married individuals
unmarried
situated
similarly
than
better
considerably
89
individuals.

83. GAO Report, supra note 68, at 1.
84. Id. DOMA became law on Sept. 26, 1996, and the GAO reported to Congress
on Jan. 31, 1997. Id.
85. Id. at 2. The GAO added a few "caveats." Id. at 2-3. First, while this
"collection of laws is as complete and representative as can be produced by a global
electronic search of the kind [the GAOl conducted," the GAO methodology had
limitations. Id. at 2-3. Thus, while "the probability is high that [the GAO] has
identified those programsin the Code in which marital status is a factor," a general
electronic search "cannot capture every individual law in the United States Code in
which marital status figures." Id. Second, the GAO clearly stated that the data
contained in the report "include[d] only laws classified to the United States Code,"
"Although
which is a "compendium of 'general and permanent' laws." Id.
appropriations and annual authorizations, for example, might contain references to
marital status, they are typically in effect for a single year and therefore do not
appear in the code." Id. "[N]o conclusions can be drawn, from our identification of
a law as one in which marital status is a factor, concerning the effect of the law on
married people versus single people." Id. The GAO suggested that while married
individuals may benefit from many of the laws, other laws might work to their
detriment. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., infra note 280 and accompanying text (showing the ways Vermont
state law provides protection and benefits to married people).
88. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
marriage under federal and state statutory law).
89. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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B. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE
DISTRIBUTION OFBENEFITS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH MARITAL STATUS
1. THE OVER- AND UNDER-INCLUSIVE
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS COLLAPSE THE
MARRIAGE JUSTIFICATIONS
Currently, marriage provides rights, benefits, privileges,
protections, and social status to some permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual couples. Simultaneously, the legal institution of
marriage denies these benefits to other permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual couples. 90 Additionally, some individuals in nonmonogamous,
non-permanent, and even non-heterosexual
relationships also receive these benefits by virtue of marital
status. 91 In this way, the distribution of benefits via marriage is
both under- and over-inclusive.
The inconsistency in the distribution of benefits, when
distributed according to marital status, causes the series of
assumptions that form the basis for marriage, and purportedly
justify the distribution of benefits through marriage, to fail.
Initially, society assumes that permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual unions are socially beneficial. 92
Society then
93
assumes, and in some ways legislatures attempt to mandate,
90. See, e.g., Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding
denial of health benefits to female plaintiffs male domestic partner, even though
they had lived together for more than twenty years and had two children together).
See also infra note 238 (citing cases involving permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual, unmarried couples).
91. But see infra note 218 and accompanying text (describing cases in which nonmonogamous, non-permanent, or non-heterosexual couples fraudulently obtained
marital benefits).
92. William C. Duncan, "Don't Ever Take a Fence Down" The "Functional"
Definition of Family - DisplacingMarriage in Family Law, 3 J.L. FAM. STUD. 57,
78 (2001). See infra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
93. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)) (defining marriage as "a
legal union between one man and one woman"). DOMA assumes that by limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples only heterosexuals will marry. This is not
necessarily the case. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that both
homosexuals and heterosexuals may marry, so long as they marry an individual of
the opposite sex). States also attempt to maintain marriage as monogamous by
making adultery grounds for divorce and by prohibiting bigamy and polygamy.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-202 (Michie 2002) (stating that only "unmarried males"
and "unmarried females" may marry); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-3 (Michie 1997)
("Two (2) individuals may not marry each other if either individual has a husband
or wife who is alive."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.01(A) (Anderson 1999) ("No
married person shall marry another or continue to cohabit with such other person
in this state"). See also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1946)
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that marriages are permanent, monogamous, heterosexual
unions. 94 Society therefore encourages marriages by according
benefits to the marital status on the assumption that this will
encourage permanent, monogamous, heterosexual coupling.
As shown above, however, some permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual couples receive the benefits of marriage while others
do not based solely on differences in marital status. 95 Some nonpermanent, non-monogamous, and even non-heterosexual couples
make efforts to receive the marital benefits.96 This inconsistency
in benefit distribution defeats its intended purpose of encouraging
a specific type of coupling because marriages need not be
permanent, monogamous, or even composed of heterosexual
Furthermore, untold numbers of unmarried
individuals.
Unless
permanent, monogamous, heterosexual couples exist.
these couples enter into a legal marriage, the state and federal
governments deny these couples the benefits of marriage. 97 It
follows that the justifications for marriage fail to justify the
Further, it follows that the
benefits accorded the status.
assumptions that supposedly justify the existence of legal
marriage fail to justify the institution at all.
2. CALLING MARRIAGE GOOD MAKES PEOPLE BE
BAD: THE BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE PROVIDE
INCENTIVE TO FRAUDULENTLY MARRY
Distributing benefits and status through marriage creates a
perverse incentive for individuals to marry, even when they have
no intention of maintaining a permanent, monogamous,
"Sham" or "fraudulent" marriages
heterosexual relationship.
and
citizens of other countries are
between U.S. citizens
(describing polygamy as "immoral in the law" and holding that "religious creed
affords no defense in a prosecution for bigamy").
94. These assumptions about the nature of the marital contract are evident in
wedding vows themselves. Assuming society takes the vow of marriage at face
value, then "'til death do you part" and "forsaking all others" creates a strong
inference that parties to a marriage intend the union to be permanent and
monogamous.
95. See Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 604 (upholding denial of some benefits to an
unmarried monogamous, heterosexual couple). See also Boyter v. Comm'r, 668
F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981) (describing the Boyters, a permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual couple who received the benefits of marriage until they divorced
without separating). In other words, the Boyters, though they were demonstrably a
permanent, monogamous, heterosexual couple, could no longer receive the benefits
of marriage.
96. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 238 (listing a number of permanent, monogamous,
heterosexual, unmarried couples).
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noteworthy examples. 98 For example, the non-U.S. citizen will
marry a U.S. citizen to acquire U.S. citizenship, or the U.S. citizen
will purchase mail-order catalogs and services to select a noncitizen bride. 99 The facts of United States v. Lee '°° provide an
example of the former.
In Lee, "the appellant entered into a 'marriage of convenience'
in Las Vegas with a Filipino national for the purpose of preventing
her deportation."' 1 In exchange, Lee "received compensation," and
"[a]ccording to plan, both he and his new wife then went their
separate ways immediately after the wedding and were divorced
about 6 months later."'0 2 Additionally, "[n]ot being satisfied with
the money he received for the sham marriage and the fraud
perpetrated on immigration authorities, [Lee] also decided to
defraud the Navy" by applying for and accepting benefits the
military provides to married service members.'0 3 While "[a] sham
marriage is void under the law of this country as against public
policy,"' 4 authorities must first discover such marriages. The fact
that fraudulent marriages occur in the military, under the nose of
U.S. authorities and in a setting defined by "honor, courage, and
commitment"'15 demonstrates the temptation provided by the
benefits of marriage and the simplicity of perpetrating such
frauds.'0 6
98. See generally Linda Kelly, Marriagefor Sale: The Mail-OrderBride Industry
and the ChangingValue of Marriage,5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 175 (2001). "In its
report to Congress in 1999, the [Immigration and Naturalization Service]
acknowledged and addressed the traditional concerns regarding the mail-order
bride industry - that it promotes both physically abusive and 'fraudulent'
marriages." Id. at 177. Kelly points out that there is a heightened likelihood of
abuse in these marriages. Id. at 183-84. This heightened likelihood of abuse is due
to the unequal distribution of power and information inherent in such
relationships, as well as the transitional difficulties faced by the transplanted
bride. Id. Additionally, the wife in such a marriage has limited ability to seek
help. Id. at 184. The chances that she would seek available help are also lessened.
Id.
99. See id. at 178. The "mail-order bride" industry, accentuates power disparities
between the sexes. Id. While not entirely analogous, male foreign-nationals could
conceivably purchase citizenship and protection from deportation by purchasing a
marriage to a female U.S. citizen.
100. 43 M.J. 794, 796 (N-M Ct. Grim. App. 1995).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. United States v. Bolden, 28 M.J. 127, 129 (C.M.A. 1989).
105. United States Navy Recruiting Command: Personal Development, at
http://www.navy.com/personaldev/index.jsp?hasFlash=true (last visited Sept. 16,
2002) ('Honor, courage, and commitment. These are the core values of the Navy
106. See 43 M.J. at 796. Another possible incentive for military personnel to
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3. COSTS CREATED BY PROVIDING BENEFITS
BASED ON MARITAL STATUS
The "sham" marriage cases demonstrate that the blind
distribution of economic benefits based on marital status creates
additional costs for society by encouraging individuals to enter into
marriages for economic reasons alone. 0 7 Individuals who marry
solely to reap one or more of the benefits of marriage commit a
fraud upon society.' 08 However, the legal institution of marriage
creates an incentive for individuals to defraud society because the
cost of entering into marriage is so small and the benefits of
marriage are so great. 109 Perhaps making entrance into marriage
more difficult or reducing the benefits of marriage would solve this
problem. However, it is contradictory to claim marriage is a
by society while
social condition encouraged
preferred
simultaneously making the condition difficult to obtain and
reducing its value. Instead, society should eliminate the legal
institution of marriage and, with it, the distribution of benefits
according to marital status.110 In place of marriage, society should
implement a system wherein the distribution of benefits actually
relates to the achievement of social goals."'

enter into "sham" marriages may be to hide their sexual orientation. Homosexual
conduct is grounds for military discharge under 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2002). Therefore,
service members may marry not only for the benefits they obtain upon marriage,
but also to reduce or eliminate suspicions about their sexuality. See, e.g., United
States v. Phillips, 52 M.J. 268, 273 (C.M.A. 2000) (Effron, J., dissenting) (noting
that in the military, homosexual conduct "is subject to mandatory discharge with
very limited exceptions" and that there is a "high degree of antipathy to
homosexuality in the armed forces.").
107. See, e.g., Bolden, 28 M.J. at 130-31 (upholding the defendant's conviction for
stealing benefits granted to married service members remarking that "there is
nothing unfair in imposing criminal liability on a servicemember who seeks to
obtain allowances from the Government by entering into a fake marriage."); United
States v. Soto, ACM No. 28407, 1990 CMR LEXIS 662, at *1 (A.F.C.M.R. June 13,
1990) (affirming defendant's conviction for "conspiring with [another] to steal
government benefits ... by orchestrating a sham marriage between [another] and a
foreign national").
108. See, e.g., Bolden, 28 M.J. at 130-31. The same is true for individuals who
divorce to receive the benefits of unmarried individuals. For example, in Boyter v.
Commissioner, the Boyters, a happily married couple, divorced solely for the
purpose of avoiding the "marriage penalty" in federal tax law. 668 F.2d 1382, 1384
(4th Cir. 1981).
109.

See

JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

78 (4th ed. 1999)

(citing Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of
Marriage,62 VA. L. REv. 663, 677-82 (1976)).
110. See infra notes 280-299 and accompanying text (discussing the abolition of
marriage and replacement thereof with contracts, statutory law, and common law).
111. See infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text (discussing a merit-based
system of rewards and benefits).
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C. CONSIDERATION OF THE BENEFITS OF
ABOLISHING MARRIAGE
Admittedly, suggesting the "aboli[tion] of marriage as a legal
category and with it any privilege based on sexual affiliation,"112
will likely "be viewed as quite radical." 113 Abolishing marriage,
however, is a meritorious means to a just end. Viewed in light of
the struggle for the equal rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered ("GLBT ' ) individuals, abolition of the legal
institution of marriage equalizes these members of society in ways
that same-sex marriages 1 4 and "civil unions" will not." 5 For
example, Vermont's "civil unions" 1 6 represent the legal status
closest to marriage available to same-sex couples."l 7 Yet, the title
itself reveals
that a "civil union" is not the legal equivalent of a
' 5
"marriage.""
Indeed,
Vermont's
"civil
unions"
law
simultaneously limits "marriage" to "the legally recognized union
of one man and one woman" 119 and creates "civil unions" for
couples "of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage
laws of this state."'120 It is unclear whether this legal distinction
stems from a perception that same-sex couples are somehow
inferior to opposite-sex couples or whether the perception comes
from the distinction. 12 1 Yet it is clear that creating one legal class
112. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND

OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995).
113. Id. at 230.
114. See infra notes 123-135 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in
which same-sex marriage will not only fail to create equality but will perpetuate
inequality).
115. "Not until same-sex couples obtain the freedom to marry will what remains
'a condition of legal inferiority' be lifted from us." Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not
Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and
SeparateBut (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 135 (2000). "Just as Louisiana gave
blacks and whites separate and (assertedly) equal railroad cars, so Vermont gives
gays and straights separate and (assertedly) equal legal forms for their committed
relationships." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice:Liberal Reflections on
the Jurisprudenceof Civil Union, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 860 (2001),
116. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202(2) (2001).
117. See Cox, supra note 115, at 116. Vermont's "civil unions" law "includes
same-sex couples in civic society to an extent not seen before in this country." Id.
118. See id. at 134. Cox describes a civil union as "an institution that (at least at
its very inception) remains only a 'thin disguise' of equality and 'a pale shadow' of
the institution of heterosexual marriage." Id.
119. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(4).
120. Id.
121. See Cox, supra note 115, at 134. "Our society's experiences with 'separate
but equal' have repeatedly shown that separation can never result in equality
because the separation is based on a belief of distance necessary to be maintained
between those in the privileged position and those placed in the inferior position."
Id.
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for same-sex couples while reserving the more privileged class for
opposite-sex couples perpetuates the inequality between the two
groups.

12 2

D. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PERPETUATION
OFINEQUALITY
Currently, the struggle for equal treatment of GLBT
individuals focuses on the right to marry and thereby reap the
benefits of marriage, as well as incur the accompanying
obligations. 123 Many gay-rights advocates view the decision of the
Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State, 124 at least to some
degree, as both a moral and legal victory. 125 This may not be the
In 2001, the divorce rate for the United States was
case.
Marriage as an
approximately half the marriage rate. 126
institution, therefore, is not functioning the way the (presumably)
heterosexual community that enjoys it would like. 127 As the
122. See id. "Restricting same-sex couples to civil unions is reminiscent of the
racism that relegated African-Americans to separate railroad cars and separate
schools and of the sexism that relegated women to separate schools." Id.
123. See Toni Broaddus, Vote No If You Believe in Marriage:Lessons from the No
on Knight/No on Proposition 22 Campaign, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2000)
(describing the failed campaign to defeat Proposition 22, which added language to
the California Family Code so that California now recognizes only opposite-sex
unions as marriages). See also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
(considering the validity of a challenge to a state's refusal to grant same-sex
couples a marriage license). See also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999)
(finding that the state of Vermont has a state constitutional "obligation to extend to
plaintiffs [three same-sex couples] the common benefit, protection, and security
that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples").
124. 774 A.2d at 886 (requiring that benefits for opposite-sex married people
under Vermont law be extended to same-sex couples).
125. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at the Crossroads: On Baker,
Common Benefits, and Facial Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935, 935 (2000) ('The
Baker decision represents a milestone in the movement to secure equal rights for
lesbians, gays, and bisexuals ...and helps clarify why reserving marriage for
different-sex couples involves an arbitrary distinction that violates state and
federal constitutional guarantees.").
126. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., Vol. 50, Number 1, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORT 1 tbl. 1
(2001) (indicating that the divorce rate for the twelve-month period ending with
January, 2001 was 4.1 per 1000 total population, excluding California, Colorado,
Louisiana and Indiana; the marriage rate for the entire United States for the same
time period was 8.5 per 1000).
127. See Susan Hager, Nostalgic Attempts to Recapture What Never Was:
Louisiana's Covenant MarriageAct, 77 NEB. L. REV. 567, 567 (1998). Susan Hager
observes, "There are widespread concerns nationwide about the impact of the
towering divorce rate currently plaguing this nation." Id. Hager also notes that
even though the divorce rate is no longer climbing, "many Americans, and
especially their lawmakers, are. extremely interested in curbing the American
divorce rate." Id. at 568.
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institution of marriage is failing those with continued exclusive
access, there is no reason to believe the institution will better
serve same-sex couples.
Furthermore, the institution of marriage creates inequality
not only between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples, but
also between unmarried and married individuals and between
unmarried couples and individuals. 128 The American institution of
marriage creates inequality because it creates a system of caste. 129
Both intentionally and unintentionally, the institution of marriage
is the social standard by which all individuals in society are
measured.' 30 It follows that securing actualization of their right to
marry the person they love will not guarantee individual members
3
of the GLBT community equal social and factual treatment.' '
Granted, the abolition of marriage would also likely fail in this
regard. However, the abolition of marriage would create a more
equal society, whereas same-sex marriage would further stratify
society. 132 Therefore, the abolition of marriage would, on balance,
confer greater equality on the GLBT community and all
individuals than same-sex marriages.
Thus, the abolition of
marriage is the more worthy goal.
Currently, the second-class "unmarried" or "single" status
affects the GLBT population and the unmarried straight
population alike. Allowing same-sex marriages would merely shift
this burden to a smaller group of unmarried people both gay and
straight. For example, a single man is either an "unmarried,
straight man" or a "gay man." One social stigma attaches to the
former, and another, entirely separate, social stigma attaches to
the latter. Same-sex marriages would stigmatize a single man as
either a "single, gay man" or a "single, straight man," with the
accompanying social stigma.133
128. See David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friendsand For Lovers of AU Sorts,
A Status Other Than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2001). "The
Census categories for marital status capture how we Americans think. Unmarried
is missing something. Unmarried is suspect, regrettable, correctable." Id. "Twothirds of Americans over thirty are married. The Census Bureau divides everyone
else into one of three groups, all defined in relation to marriage. They are the
'never married,' the 'divorced, and 'the widowed.' They are the hopeful, the failed,
and the bereaved." Id. at 1347 (citing the U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEl'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 52, tbl. 55 (120th ed.

2000).
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See infra note 133.
132. See supra notes 123-135 and accompanying text (discussing the inequality
same-sex marriage would perpetuate).
133. Unpleasant as the fact is to consider, Matthew Shepard, Barry Winchell,
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Choosing to remain unmarried, failing to find a suitable
mate, nor rejecting all acceptable suitors should form the basis for
inequitable social, economic, and legal treatment. As shown in the
discussion below, unmarried individuals do not inherently
134
contribute less to society simply because they are unmarried.
Unmarried individuals, both gay and straight, maintain
committed loving relationships, raise children, work, and pay
taxes. 135 Therefore, these individuals and their children deserve
the benefits and protections of marriage. These individuals do not
deserve the stigma, economic inequities, and emotional strain
forced upon them by their "unmarried" or "single" status.
and Billy Jack Gaither, as examples, would all likely still be dead even if they were
legally married to a same-sex partner at the time of their murder. See Tom
Kenworthy, 2nd Man Is Convicted Of Killing Gay Student, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
1999, at Al, A17 (reporting that it took a jury less than 10 hours to find a second
man guilty of beating 21-year-old Matthew Shepard to death in a crime believed to
be motivated, at least in part, by sexual orientation bias); Sue Anne Pressley, Hate
May Have Triggered Fatal Barracks Beating, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1999, at Al,
A10 (reporting that the other men in U.S. Army Private First Class Barry
Winchell's company called him a "faggot" and other hate-related derogatory names
on an almost daily basis for months). Winchell was beaten to death with a baseball
bat on a U.S. military base while Winchell's Army roommate "encouraged the
attack." Id. at A10. A fellow soldier has been charged with Winchell's murder. See
also Chuck Barney, 'Frontline'Episode Explores the Prevalence of Crimes Against
Homosexuals, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 15, 2000, available at LEXIS, News
Library, AllNews File ("In February of last year, 39-year-old openly gay Billy Jack
Gaither of Sylacauga, Ala., was brutally beaten with an ax handle. His throat was
slashed and then his body was set on fire."). Support for this contention exists in
the equally unpleasant fact that the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the
United States Constitution, the "equal rights amendments," failed to prevent
untold incidents of violence arising out of the "race bias" of the attacker. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. See UNIF.
CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: HATE CRIME STATISTICS 14 tbl. 7 (2000) (reporting that 5171 "incidents"
motivated by "race bias" - including ten "murders and nonnegligent
manslaughters" - occurred in the United States in the year 2000 alone), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/hateOO.pdf (last visited Sep. 24, 2002).
In
comparison, that same year the FBI reported two incidents of "murder or
nonnegligent manslaughter" resulting from "sexual orientation bias." Id. In the
prior year the FBI reported nine incidents of "murder or nonnegligent
manslaughter" resulting from "race bias" and three from "sexual orientation bias."
UNIF. CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS: HATE CRIME STATISTICS 10 tbl. 4 (1999), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/99hate.pdf (last visited Sep. 24, 2002). The year 1998 saw
eight from race bias and four from sexual orientation bias. UNIF. CRIME
REPORTING PROGRAM, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
HATE
CRIME
STATISTICS
10
tbl.
4
(1998),
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/98hate.pdf (lastvisited Sep. 24, 2002). Thus, we know from
history that even when groups receive facially equal treatment in law, they often
receive strikingly different treatment in fact.
134. See infra notes 149-279 and accompanying text (showing that unmarried
individuals achieve many of the ostensible justifications of marriage).
135. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, marriage is not the solution to these inequalities.
The solution is the elimination of marriage and its accompanying
caste system.
In advocating the abolition of legal marriage in order to
create social equality, gay-rights advocates could gain support
from at least two groups of unlikely allies: married individuals
uncomfortable with the privileges afforded them by their marital
status, and unmarried individuals motivated by the inequality the
legal institution of marriage creates.
IV. THE OSTENSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
EXCLUSIVELY OPPOSITE-SEX MARRIAGE
In 1996 Congress passed DOMA. 136 An examination of the
floor debates relating to DOMA, however, reveals no substantive
reasons to defend the institution of marriage. 137 The justifications
articulated by members of Congress for the maintenance of
marriage as a purely opposite-sex institution include: social
ramifications, 138 tradition,139 history, 140 economics,' 4 1 child

136. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
137. 142 CONG. REC. H7270, H7480 (1996) (House of Representative debates on
the Defense of Marriage Act). See also 142 CONG. REC. S10100 (1996) (Senate
debates on the Defense of Marriage Act).
138. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7493 (1996) (statement of Rep. Ensign).
"The time-honored and unique institution of marriage between one man and one
woman is a fundamental pillar of our society and its values." Id. See also 142
CONG. REC. H7270, H7275 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr). "[M]arriage [is] a basic
institution, an institution basic not only to this country's foundation and to its
survival but to every Western civilization." Id.
139. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7490 (1996) (statement of Rep. Bryant).
I think it is very important that we remember much of our history lessons,
that I am sure have already been discussed here before. Without our
action, this would be the first time that any religious or civil marriage
ceremony recognized this type of marriage. It would be against the
traditional marriage of husband and wife.
Id. See also 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7495 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lipinski).
"Homosexual marriages would destroy thousands of years of tradition which has
upheld our society." Id. See also 142 CONG. REC. H7270, H7273 (1996) (statement
of Rep. McInnis).
I think it is particularly important to take a look at the traditional
marriage .... If we look at any definition, whether it Black's Law
Dictionary, whether it is Webster's Dictionary, a marriage is defined as
union between a man and a woman, and that should be upheld, there is no
reason to be ashamed of that tradition. It is a long-held tradition.
Id.
140. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7487 (1996) (statement of Rep. DeLay).
"We need to protect our social and moral foundations." Id. See also 142 CONG.
REC. H7480, H7488 (1996) (statement of Rep. Stearns). "[Same-sex marriages]
threaten the future of families which have traditional marriage at their very heart.
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rearing, 142 and that opposite-sex marriage is what God wants for
humanity.143
Outside of Congress, some supporters of purely opposite-sex
marriage also attempt to justify their opinion that "the preferred
legal status and benefits of marriage should not be extended to
unions other than traditional marriages."' 144 These scholars make
brief reference to a number of social interests, 145 before reaching
If [Congress fails to pass the Defense of Marriage Act] traditional marriage is
thrown by the wayside, brought down by ... manipulation of the definition that has
been accepted since the beginning of civilized society." Id. See also 142 CONG. REC.
H7480, H7489 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lewis). "[Two hundred twenty] years of
history in this Nation where we have not had to define what marriage is. It has
been pretty common knowledge and it has been understood by most people." Id.
141. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7488 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr).
"[I]f you do not believe that it is fiscally responsible to throw open the doors of the
U.S. Treasury to be raided by the homosexual movement [vote for the Defense of
Marriage Act]." Id. See also 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7489 (1996) (statement of
Rep. Canady).
We have a responsibility as the Congress to determine how Federal funds
will be spent, and I believe that it is certainly within our prerogative to
determine that those funds will not be used to support an institution
which is rejected by the vast majority of the American people.
Id. See also 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7493 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
[Tihe Federal Government generally recognizes State documents in
granting benefits and privileges to married individuals.
Veterans'
benefits, labor policies, Federal health and pension benefits, and Social
Security benefits are just a few of the areas that would be subjected to
substantive revision if Congress does not act soon. I think it would be
wrong to take money out of the pockets of working families across America
and use those tax dollars to give Federal acceptance and financial support
to same sex-marriages.
Id. See also 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7495 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lipinski).
[If the Federal Government does not act now, and Hawaii legalizes
homosexual marriage, the Federal Government would then be obliged to
provide the same benefits that heterosexual marriages currently receive.
Unless this bill is passed establishing a Federal definition of marriage, all
Americans will then be paying for benefits for homosexual marriages.
Id.
142. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. H7480, H7487 (1996) (statement of Rep. DeLay).
"Children do best in a family with a mom and a dad." Id. See also 142 CONG. REC.
H7480, H7488 (1996) (statement of Rep. Stearns). "[Without DOMA] children will
suffer because family will lose its very essence." Id. See also 142 CONG. REC.
H7480, H7493 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon). "The marriage relationship
provides children with the best environment in which to grow and learn." Id.
143. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7486 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Seastrand). "We as legislators and leaders for the country are in the midst of a
chaos, an attack upon God's principles. God laid down that one man and one
woman is a legal union. That is marriage, known for thousands of years. That
God-given principle is under attack." Id. Considerations of divine intentions
and/or desires are well beyond the scope of this Article. The author leaves these
matters to those far better equipped to make such determinations.
144. Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,supra note 40, at 772.
145. See id. at 800. The eight interests listed by Wardle are as follows: (1) safe
sexual relations; (2) responsible procreation; (3) optimal child rearing; (4) healthy
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the conclusion that the primary societal interests in marriage are
those related to procreation,1 46 and the procreative potential of
The discussion below groups,
male-female genital sex.' 47
addresses, and refutes the justifications members of Congress
offered during the DOMA debates for enacting a federal law
defining marriage as purely opposite-sex. The discussion also
addresses and refutes the justifications of legal and social scholars
mentioned above.
A. ENCOURAGING STABLE AND LOVING
RELATIONSHIPS- "LOVE AND MARRIAGE, LOVE

AND MARRIAGE...

",148

Supporters of marriage attempt to justify the institution by
citing the social goal of encouraging stable and loving
relationships. 149 This justification is inadequate, however, as
150
If the
stable and loving relationships are naturally occurring.
institution of marriage were eliminated, people would continue to
5
fall in love, form stable relationships, and create family units.' '
Legal marriage is also unnecessary to achieve the goal of stable
and loving relationships because people form such relationships
even when denied access to marriage. The stable and loving
relationships formed by numerous same-sex couples supports this
statement, 15 2 as do the relationships between slaves in the early
human development; (5) protecting those who undertake the most vulnerable
family roles for the benefit of society, especially wives and mothers; (6) securing the
stability and integrity of the basic unit of society; (7) fostering civic virtue,
democracy, and social order; and (8) facilitating inter-jurisdictional compatibility.
Id. at 779-80.
146. See id. at 782. The procreation-specific interests listed by Wardle are "(1)
perpetuation and survival of the species, (2) public health and child welfare, (3)
linking procreation with child rearing and connecting parents to offspring, and (4)
protecting the social order and social institution that best fosters responsible
procreation." Id.
147. See id.
148. Sammy Cohn & Jimmy Van Heusen, Love and Marriage(1955).
149. See George W. Dent, The Defense of TraditionalMarriage, 15 J.L. & POL.
581, 590 (1999) (identifying the justification of encouraging stable and loving
relationships and classifying it as false and unpersuasive).
150. See id. at 591.
151. Sadly, American history provides substantial evidence for this contention.
Young America denied slaves entrance into the institution of marriage. See COTT,
supra note 7, at 33. Despite this, slaves continued to maintain loving relationships,
form families whenever possible, and have children whom they raised to the best of
their abilities under the circumstances. Id.
152. Examples of these couples include the plaintiffs in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 867 (Vt. 1999) C'Plaintiffs are three same-sex couples who have lived together
in committed relationships for periods ranging from four to twenty-five years. Two
of the couples have raised children together."). See also Weigand v. Houghton, 730
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days of the Union 153 and the relationships of unknown numbers of
inter-racial couples when states criminalized such marriages. 5 4
An incredible variety of stable and loving relationships exist
outside of the marital context, as well as between married
individuals and individuals other than their spouse. 155 The
relationships between partners of the same sex, unmarried
opposite-sex partners, friends, and family members are just a few
examples. Furthermore, love is not a legal prerequisite to, or
requirement of, legal marriage. 156 Therefore, legal marriage does
not guarantee the existence of love in any given relationship.
Considering the rate at which marriages end, either because
of divorce or the death of one partner, 5 7 marriage does not make a
relationship particularly stable. An examination of the rhetoric of
"opposite-sex only" marriage also reveals that the definition of
"stability" is rather pliable. The American Heritage Dictionary
defines "stability" as, "resistance to change, deterioration, or
displacement."' 158 However, experience tells us that with respect to
marriage, "stability" is often used interchangeably with "keeping
up appearances."' 159 Given the benefits of marriage 160 and the

So.2d 581, 584 (Miss. 1999) Petitioner and his male partner had been together for
eight years, jointly owned their home and "entered into a living trust agreement
and domestic partnership agreement [and held] themselves out as a couple and
describ[ed] their relationship as monogamous." Id.
153. See COTT, supra note 7, at 32-49 (describing the laws, social behaviors, and
issues arising from the formation of marriage-like relationships and families
between slaves).
154. The Lovings, defendants in Loving v. Virginia, are a single, brave example.
388 U.S. 1,3 (1967). The Lovings pled guilty to the charge of marrying interracially
and were sentenced to one year in jail. Id. However, the trial judge suspended the
sentence on the condition that "the Lovings leave the State and not return to
Virginia together for [twenty-five] years." Id.
155. See Dent, supra note 149, at 591 (noting that the state prohibits a number of
loving relationships from becoming marriages, including love between relatives, the
love married individuals have for people other than their spouse, the love of
children, and the love people feel for their pets).
156. See id.
157. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 126, at 1 tbl.
1. See Arland Thornton, Comparative and HistoricalPerspectives on Marriage,
Divorce, and Family Life, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 587, 595 (noting that divorce has
over-taken mortality as the cause of most marital dissolutions).
158. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1687
(Houghton Mifflin Company 4th ed. 2000).
159. William E. Nelson, Patriarchyor Equality: Family Values or Individuality,
70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 435, 445 (1996) (describing various ways tried by the state of
New York to keep people married despite the desire of at least one of the spouses to
divorce).
160. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
marriage under federal statutory law).
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social stigma and financial consequences of divorce, 16 1 reasonable
individuals should attempt to stay married as long as possible.
Those in favor of marriage would likely cite this as support for the
institution and proof of the stability the institution creates. This
reasoning, however, is faulty.
Although considerable pressure exists to remain married,
half of all marriages still end in divorce. 162 The inference is that
163
many dissatisfied or truly unhappy individuals remain married.
This is not to imply that the majority of marriages are unhappy.
However, because reasonable individuals will only divorce when
their dissatisfaction with their marriage exceeds the sum of the
benefits of being married and their aversion to the consequences of
divorce, it follows that at least some individuals remain married
despite some level of unhappiness. 164 While outwardly this may
create the appearance of stability, two people unhappily wed do
Unhappy
not represent a socially stable or desirable ideal.
marriages may lead to socially undesirable behaviors like
adultery, alcohol abuse, and domestic violence. 165 Additionally, by
remaining in "loveless" marriages for the sake of "stability,"
individuals are prevented from developing other truly loving and,
therefore, more stable relationships. In other words, in marriage,
"loving" relationships are often forsaken for "stable" ones.
161. See, e.g., Raymond C. O'Brian, The Reawakening of Marriage, 102 W. VA. L.
REV. 339, 355-56 (1999) (discussing the emotional, psychological and economic
ramifications of divorce).
162. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
163. See generally Richard B. Goldbloom, Back to the Kitchen, 36 CLINICAL
PEDIATRICS 373 (1997). Dr. Goldbloom's experiences support this contention. In
asking his patients to describe their marriage in one word Dr. Goldbloom notes:
"[the occasional instant smile and an unhesitating 'Great!', but too often a puzzled
silence, a frown, averted eyes, or outright tears speak volumes about the quality of
the union." Id. at 376.
164. If this assumption is correct, individuals will divorce at different levels of
dissatisfaction depending on the value they place on the variables within the
equation. Examples of the working variables include the value to the individual of
the economic benefits of marriage, aversion to the social stigma of divorce, the egos
of the individuals involved and importance to the individuals of being happy within
their marriage.
165. See Michael F. Myers, TreatingTroubled Marriages,29 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN
221, 226 (1984). Myers states:
Marital distress inevitably touches all members of the family and can have
Among the
profound effects on both physical and mental health.
symptoms or situations that may be associated with marital problems are
bodily complaints (frequent headaches, low back pain, gastrointestinal
disorders), depression, anxiety states, alcoholism, sexual dysfunction,
extramarital activity, wife abuse, physical and/or sexual abuse of children,
juvenile delinquency and adolescent suicidal behavior.
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Consider cases involving domestic abuse within marriage.
Such cases may seem extreme, yet experts estimate abuse occurs
in approximately one quarter of all relationships, 166 including
marriages. 167 Undoubtedly, abusive marriages are not the "stable
and loving relationships" advocates cite in support of legal
marriage. In addition to myriad other factors that act to keep
victims in abusive relationships, 168 abused wives and husbands
experience the additional pressures felt by all married couples to
preserve their legal union. Although this makes marriage more
"stable" than similarly situated unmarried relationships, such
twisted stability is not something society should advocate. In
abusive marriages many of the justifications cited in support of
marriage - including the economic consequences of divorce 169 and
the belief that children benefit from the marital status of their
parents 170 - work to trap individuals in cycles of abuse. Ironically,
the justifications for marriage work to prevent individuals in
abusive marriages from leaving the abuser and gaining the ability
and opportunity to develop truly healthy and loving relationships.
In these cases, the justifications of marriage prevent individuals

166. See Pamela M. Jablow, Victims of Abuse and Discriminations:Protecting
Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1095, 1105 (2000). "Researchers approximate that heterosexual domestic violence
occurs in twenty-five percent of all such couples. The incidence of battering in
homosexual relationships is estimated to occur at the same rate." Id. See also
Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs National Institute of Justice, and Center for Disease Control, Findings
from the National Violence Against Women Survey: Extent Nature and
Consequences of Intimate PartnerViolence, NJC 181867 at 9, Exhibit 1 (July 2000)
(reporting that 22.1% of women and 7.4% of men - a total of 1.3 million women and
834,732 men in the preceding 12 months of the survey - are the victims of
"intimate
violence"
in
their
lifetime)
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/nij/181867.txt. See also Virginia H. Murray, A
Comparative Survey of the Historic Civil, Common, and American Indian Tribal
Law Responses to Domestic Violence, 23 OKIA- CITY U. L. REV. 433, 433 (1998) "By
some estimates, there are as many as four million incidents of domestic violence
per year in the United States." Id. Also, the FBI "reports that a woman is beaten
every eighteen seconds, that domestic violence is a leading cause of injury to
women in the United States, and that one-half of all homeless women are refugees
from domestic violence." Id.
167. See Michelle J. Anderson, A License To Abuse: The Impact of Conditional
Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1402-03 (1993). "Studies vary
widely in estimating the percentage (between 12-50%) of all married women who
experience some form of domestic battery in their lives." Id.
168. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372-73 (N.J. 1984) (discussing the reasons
women abused by their intimate partners remain in the relationships).
169. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text (discussing the economic
implications of divorce).
170. See infra notes 177-206 and accompanying text (refuting the contention that
married couples provide the best environment in which to raise children).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 21:114

from developing truly stable relationships.
If society truly has an interest in encouraging stable and
loving relationships, then society should encourage people to love,
not to marry. If stable and loving relationships are truly at issue,
If the
society should reward all such relationships equally.
societal goal is stable and loving relationships, then society should
afford stable and loving gay, straight, polygamous, and
incestuous17 ' relationships the same social, economic and legal
treatment.1 72 Therefore, in restricting marriage to a single form
and then encouraging marriage by according married people
171. Advocates of opposite-sex only marriage often imply, and in some cases
expressly make, the argument that recognition of same-sex marriage is a slippery
slope to demands for legal recognition of polygamous relationships, incestuous
relationships, and "relationships" between individual humans and animals that
involve sexual acts. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986)
(claiming that if the Court were to find homosexuals have a fundamental right to
engage in private, consensual homosexual sex, "it would be difficult, except by fiat,
to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to
prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are
committed in the home."); U.S. NEWSWIRE, Derby Citizen Advises Parentsof Their
Right To Opt Out, at http://wwww.usnewswire.com/topnews/search3/0802-108.html
(Aug. 2, 2001) (reporting that a group campaigned for Vermont's parents to demand
that schools "specifically refrain from addressing issues of homosexuality,
bisexuality, lesbianism, transvestitism, transexuality, sado-masochism, pedophilia,
beastiality or other alternatives to monogamous heterosexual sex within marriage
in any manner which would convey the message to [a] child that such
orientations/behaviors are immutable, unchangeable, natural, normal, or
harmless"). See also Roger D. Willis, Letter to the Editor,VENTURA COUNTY STAR,
March 30, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, AllNews File. Willis urged
Californians to vote against California Bills AB 222, SB1260, AB 1001, AB 26, AB
107, SB 75, SB 118, which Willis claimed were "designed to require special status
to sodomites, and will require your public schools to teach things you neither
believe to be true nor condone." Id. Willis argued, "[I]f we, as a society, allow
Can beastiality [sic] be far
these bills to pass, can you guess what might be next? ...
behind?" Id. See also James G. Callahan, Letter to the Editor: Same-Sex Marriage,
ST. LOUIS POsT-DISPATCH, December 14, 1996 at 35. In arguing against same-sex
marriage, Callahan implied a slippery slope by asking, "Should polygamy be
approved? How about beastiality? Is any perversion to be approved because we are
so enlightened in the '90s?" Id. With the single exception that follows, the author
makes no comment on, does not speak to, and offers no opinion with respect to the
current or future legal status of polygamous or incestuous relationships. The
author notes only that these types of relationships often include power disparities
as well as a host of other factors that make them extremely complicated and
controversial subjects. Respecting references to bestiality, the author will only go
so far as to state that such "relationships" are so far afield from relationships
between human beings that they are inapplicable and inappropriate in rational
discussions of romantic, intimate, or committed human relationships. The author
will not substantively address such references further as doing so would give such
references undeserved validity.
172. This is not to advocate, condemn, or condone any or all of these forms of
relationships. This is only to make the point that it is the feelings, behavior, and
circumstances of the individuals within a relationship, not the legal status of the
relationship, that makes the relationship stable and loving.
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benefits and privileges, society: (1) provides less incentive for
individuals uninterested in marriage or unable to marry to form
stable and loving relationships, assuming marriage does in fact
create such relationships; (2) fails to reward individuals who
create stable and loving relationships outside of marriage, thereby
creating unjustified social and economic inequality; and (3) wastes
social resources by rewarding married individuals on the
assumption that their marriage is stable and loving, even when
Abolishing the legal institution of
that assumption is false. i
marriage and instead enacting general laws that confer the rights,
privileges, and obligations currently afforded marriage upon those
would accomplish this goal
within stable and loving relationships
74
far more effectively and equitably.1
Furthermore, it is impossible to know whether the longevity
of any given relationship would change with marital status. Thus,
it is impossible to determine the actual effectiveness of marriage
in encouraging "stable" relationships. One can only know the
outcome of a single series of events; proof of "what would have
been" is impossible to obtain. Therefore, we cannot know whether
a couple whose marriage lasted five years would have remained
together for six, ten, or twenty years if they had never married.
Likewise, we can never know whether an unwed couple that
breaks up after three years would have lasted four, five, fifteen, or
thirty years had they been legally wed. However, unless we define

173. Take, for example, same-sex couples who travel to Vermont to enter into a
civil union. See supra notes 119-120. Despite the fact that a number of these
couples travel considerable distances to obtain the closest available substitute to a
legal marriage, they receive none of the legal benefits of marriage in any state but
Vermont. Thus, while two opposite-sex individuals can meet in a Las Vegas casino
at 9:00 a.m. and have every state in the union regard them as legally married by
midnight, a same-sex couple that has lived together for twenty-five years and
traveled from San Diego, California to Burlington, Vermont for a "civil union" is
still "unmarried" under the laws of every state. While society, the federal
government, and all of the states would immediately confer the benefits of
marriage upon the Las Vegas couple, the Burlington couple would receive only
those benefits accorded married individuals under Vermont statutory law, and even
then only in Vermont. This example highlights the failings of this particular
justification of marriage. See generally Mark Strasser, Mission Impossible: On
Baker, Equal Benefits, and the Imposition of Stigma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1,
2 (2000) (observing that one of the primary failings of civil unions is their "lack of
portability"). Strasser observes that "[a] civil union alternative for same-sex
couples, while better than what any other state has offered thus far, nonetheless
cannot offer equal benefits, protections, and security, precisely because civil unions
are less likely than marriages to be recognized in other jurisdictions." Id. Such a
system can hardly serve to create or encourage stable and loving relationships.
174. See infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text (discussing a merit-based
system of benefit distribution).
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an institution with a failure rate of 50% as "stabilizing,"'175
marriage does not make relationships particularly stable. We will
more equitably and more effectively achieve the stated goal of
creating stable relationships by abolishing marriage and instead
encouraging and rewarding
those aspects of relationships that do
176
enhance their stability.

B. GOALS RELATED TO CHILD REARING
Proponents of opposite-sex only marriage offer a few offspring
related justifications for according benefits and privileges to
marriage, and by implication, perpetuation of the institution.
They argue that the opposite-sex institution of marriage is the
best for children 177 and that society should reward the procreative
78
potential of marriage.
Studies confirm that children raised by gay and lesbian
individuals are just as healthy and happy as children raised by
heterosexual individuals. 79
However, marriage advocates
continue to argue that purely opposite-sex marriage is necessary
to serve society's interest in protecting children 8 0°
These
175. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text.
177.
See,
e.g.,
Massachusetts
Citizens
for
Marriage
at
http://www.marriagematters.org/FAQ
(last visited July 29, 2002). The
Massachusetts Citizens for Marriage wish to change the Massachusetts
Constitution such that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would recognize only
opposite-sex unions as marriages. Id. In support of their goal, the Citizens claim
that "children need to be raised, whenever possible, by a mother and a father in a
committed marriage. This provides a stable foundation protecting the child from
neglect and has been supported throughout history by common sense and scientific
studies." Id. The Citizens cite no authority for their claim, but go on to conclude
that "[a]ny other relationship, such as civil unions, gay marriages, or domestic
partnerships, seeking to redefine the meaning of marriage or family, will be
detrimental to society and to our children." Id.
178. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Should the Government Recognize Same-Sex
Marriage?:Legal, Equitable, and PoliticalIssues, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
33, 36 (2000). See also Duncan, supra note 92, at 78. Duncan believes that "the
marriage-based family deserves preferred legal status precisely because it is the
best forum for providing all of the contributions to children and to society that are
offered only in part by other relationships." Id.
179. See Ellen C. Perrin, Technical Report: Coparent or Second-ParentAdoption
by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341 (2002). See also Ellen C. Perrin & Heidi
Kulkin, Pediatric Care for Children Whose Parents Are Gay or Lesbian, 97
PEDIATRICS 629 (1996). Perrin and Kulkin state that "[a] growing number of
children have at least one parent who is gay or lesbian. There is no evidence that
these children experience any particular difficulties as a result of their parent's
sexual orientation." Id. at 629.
180.
See,
e.g.,
Massachusetts
Citizens
for
Marriage,
at
http://www.marriagematters.org (last visited July 29, 2002). See also supra note
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advocates claim that child rearing within same-sex relationships is
inherently harmful because it denies children the combination of
mother and father. 181 While typically applied exclusively to gay
and lesbian couples, confining this argument in such a manner is
unnecessary. Single heterosexual parents may also deny their
18 2
children the right of parenting by both a mother and a father.
This argument is ineffective regardless of the application because
"conscientious gay parents, like conscientious straight single
parents, take steps to ensure their children have male and female
84
role models."183 Medical research also supports this contention.
Additionally, "[elvidence exists that the ways in which a family
supports the growth and development of its children is far more
' 85
important than its particular structural characteristics."'
186
and People v. Silva18 7
The cases of Weigand v. Houghton
provide examples of cases where, despite the presence of a legal
marriage, the home of a married couple was far from an ideal
situation in which to raise a child. In Weigand, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi upheld a denial of a gay father's request for
177 and accompanying text (describing the claims of the Massachusetts Citizens for
Marriage that a man and a woman legally wed is the best family form in which to
raise children).
181. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturingthe
Meaningof Marriage,73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1551 (1998). "The most recent
empirical evidence now available establishes what Americans instinctively know a child benefits measurably by having a married mother (a female) and father (a
male) in the home. The benefits are physical, emotional, psychological, and
economic." Id. at 1552.
182. See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
19, 21-22 (1995). "Single-parent families now constitute twenty-six percent of all
families with minor children and are the most rapidly growing family form in
America." Id. The contention that single parents do their children injustice is also
patently racist. See id. "When family households are broken down by race, singleparent households are the dominant family form for African-Americans and a
significant and growing alternative family form for Hispanics (thirty-three percent)
and whites (twenty-three percent)." Id. As Dowd notes, "[miany commentators use
the racialization of unwed single parenthood to reserve the highest level of stigma
for black single mothers." Id.
183. DAN SAVAGE, THE KID: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER MY BOYFRIEND AND I
DECIDED To Go GET PREGNANT, AN ADOPTION STORY 58 (1999).
184. See Perrin, supra note 179, at 342. Perrin states that "[liesbian mothers
strongly endorse child-centered attitudes and commitment to their maternal roles
and have been shown to be more concerned with providing male role models for
their children than are divorced heterosexual mothers." Id.
185. Ellen C. Perrin, Children in Diverse Family Constellations,99 PEDIATRICS
881 (1997). Perrin states, "Neither advantage nor disadvantage for a child comes
automatically with any specific type of family. Families of diverse makeup are
capable of supporting the healthy development of their children and meeting their
physical and emotional needs." Id. at 881-82.
186. 730 So.2d 581 (Miss. 1999).
187. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181 (Cal. App. 4th 1994).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 21:114

residential custody of his son 188 even though the mother's home
was "an explosive environment in which the unemployed
stepfather is a convicted felon, drinker, drug-taker, adulterer,
wife-beater, and child-threatener, and in which the mother has
been transitory, works two jobs, and has limited time with the
child." 189 The court made "such a decision despite the fact that
[the child]'s father has a good job, a stable home and does all
within his power to care for his son." 190
In Silva, the defendant married the woman who became his
wife shortly after learning she was pregnant.' 91 The defendant
then set out on a course of extremely violent abuse of his wife,
including raping her on no less than four occasions.192 On these
occasions, his wife "did not want to have intercourse because her
doctor had warned her it might endanger her pregnancy." 193
Despite the fact that the Silvas were legally married, one can infer
that the Silva home was a less than ideal environment in which to
rear a child.
Case law is rife with cases like Weigand and Silva in which
children live in homes where, despite the "married" legal status of
the primary care givers, the home is an unsupportive, unhealthy,
neglectful, and even abusive environment for a child. From these
cases it is abundantly clear that legal marriage alone fails to make
an individual or couple better equipped to raise a child than an
unmarried individual or couple, and that the married individual or
couple cannot necessarily provide the best environment available
for the child. Thus, in addition to failing to justify "opposite-sex
only" marriage, the justifications for marriage relating to the
creation of healthy or ideal environments for childrearing fail to
justify marriage at all.
Many of the arguments supporting child rearing within
marriage focus on the higher rate of poverty among divorced
women and their children. 94 This implies that the solution to this
problem is to remain married. Considering, however, that "more
childhood poverty occurs within two-parent families than one188. Weigand, 730 So.2d at 587-88. (deciding that the father retained joint
custody, but not residential custody of his son).
189. Id. at 588 (McRae, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. 33 Cal. Rptr.2d at 183.
192. Id. at 182.
193. Id. at 183.
194. See, e.g., O'Brian, supra note 161, at 355-57 (noting that divorced women
and their children, especially women and children of color, are more likely to be
impoverished than their married counterparts).
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195

parent families," marriage is not the solution to poverty.
Additionally, advocating marriage as the solution to poverty
among single women and their children neglects the underlying
causes of the elevated poverty rate within these particular
Contributing factors include the
demographic populations.' 96
197
compared to men in general,
women
of
potential
earning
lower
198
lack of support for single mothers from the
child care expenses,
fathers of their children, 199 and the absence of insurance benefits
in jobs traditionally held by women. 200 Attempting to use the
institution of marriage to provide for women and children instead
of addressing the underlying causes of poverty of single women
and their children, therefore, does little to further the stated goal
of protecting children. Other solutions, such as the enactment of
general laws forcing non-custodial parents to financially assist the
201
custodial parents of their children, are already in place.
Increased enforcement of these laws would eliminate, or at least
alleviate, the poverty of mothers and their children regardless of
marital status. Furthermore, the mere fact that a family's
earnings exceed the poverty level does not prove that the family
adequately cares for its children, that the family spends an
is a
adequate sum on necessities for the children, or that the home
20 2
children.
raise
to
which
in
environment
particularly healthy
195. Dowd, supranote 182, at 27.
196. See id. Dowd writes, "The poverty of single-parent families is tied not to
family form but rather to the disadvantaged economic position of the mothers
heading most of these families." Id.
197. See Kathy R. Davis, Bankruptcy: A Moral Dilemma for Women Debtors, 22
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 235, 239-40 (1998) (discussing why women file for
bankruptcy) (quoting Karen Gross, Revision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images
of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1527 (1990)).
198. See id.
199. See id. at 241.
200. See id. This fact reveals gender inequality in two distinct ways. The first is
that traditional women's jobs are deemed less valuable than traditional men's jobs
and, therefore, come with less compensation in the form of both benefits and pay.
The second gender inequality is that marriage is a condition precedent to coverage,
for many women, under the medical insurance plans offered as a benefit of jobs
historically classified as men's. In this manner, society makes marriage a necessity
for women, while creating no such need in the male population. Thus, women are
kept dependent upon marriage and - under DOMA and similar laws - men, for
access to medical care for themselves and their children.
201. See Nat'l Women's Law Center, As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners:In
the Supreme Court of the United States, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 343,
368 (2001).
202. See, e.g., Kate Hollenbeck, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Child Abuse
Registriesat the Intersectionof Child Protection,Due Process,and Equal Protection,
11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 39-40 (2001) (noting that child abuse and child neglect
are likely considerably under-reported in White, affluent families and that the
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Moreover, the stigma of divorce, not the end of their parent's
marriage, can have a profound mental and emotional impact on
children. 203 Just as society historically stigmatized children born
outside of marriage as "illegitimate", society currently stigmatizes
the "children of divorce." 204 Without marriage, there would be no
divorce. Instead, the relationships of all parents would share the
same legal status. 20 5 The elimination of marriage would eradicate
illegitimacy as well as prevent children from suffering the stigma
20 6
of divorce.
C. THE MORALITY JUSTIFICATION
Proponents of marriage claim that marriage enhances the
morality of society. 207 This implies that entering into and existing
within the legal institution of marriage is morally superior to
existing outside of the institution. 2 8 The condition of "married" is
These claims,
not morally superior to other conditions. 20 9
therefore, rest upon a critical assumption: by entering into and
remaining within the legal institution of marriage, individuals
achieve, or at least gain the ability to achieve, certain social
goals.2 10 However, married individuals are not the only members

socioeconomic position of these families can help hide incidents of abuse and
neglect).
203. See generally Marcia Lipman Lebowitz, Divorce and the American Teenager,
76 PEDIATRICS 695, 695-98 (1985) Lebowitz described the effects of divorce on
children, noting, "The term, 'children of divorce' has become part of our every-day
language, but unfortunately it carries a subtle negative connotation, an association
of problems and failure." Id at 697.
204. Id. "These attitudes are subtle but pervasive, and their impact on 'children
of divorce' may be as important as the impact of divorce itself." Id. at 698.
205. See FINEMAN, supra note 112, at 229.
206. Cf. id. at 230 (asserting that the end of legal marriage would preclude
"differential treatment of children based on their parents' marital status").
207. Bradley, supra note 4. See also infra note 214 and accompanying text; supra
note 140 and accompanying text (remarks of Rep. Delay).
208. Bradley, supra note 4. See also infra note 214 and accompanying text; supra
note 140 and accompanying text (remarks of Rep. Delay).
209. If this were so, then all married people, including adulterers, child and
spousal abusers, and individuals who abandoned their families but did not divorce,
would be morally superior to all unmarried people. It is doubtful that even
Bradley, Coolidge, Duncan, Wardle, or the members of Congress that supported
DOMA on some assumption of the heightened morality of marriage would endorse
such a conclusion.
210. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 92 and accompanying text (claiming that
entrance into the legal status of "married" allows couples to contribute more to
Examples of the
society than single individuals and unmarried couples).
assumptions about the ability of marriage to achieve, or provide couples the ability
to achieve, certain social goals include the assumptions that marriage enhances the
love and stability of a relationship and encourages procreation and childrearing.
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of society to achieve these goals, and not all marriages achieve
these goals. 211 If marriage fails to achieve specified social goals
and thus fails to increase the morality of society, then the
assumption necessary to conclude that being married is morally
superior to being unmarried is false. Therefore, the morality
justification for the existence of opposite-sex only marriage is
invalid. It follows that supplanting the institution of marriage
with a system that rewards individuals and relationships
proportionally to their success in achieving the specified social
goals will increase the morality of society.
If marriage is the moral foundation of our society, yet half of
all marriages end in divorce, 212 then society is on very shaky moral
ground indeed. Accordingly, there is no shortage of suggestions for
2 13
potential ways to fix the current marriage situation.
Considering the flawed nature of the institution of marriage,
scholars would better serve society by contemplating the
elimination of marriage and generating ideas for the form and
214
function of alternatives.
Additionally, reasonable minds disagree on whether the
current American legal institution of marriage actually enhances
the morality of American society. 2 15 Even those most passionate
about the marital ideal of a legally and socially recognized
permanent, monogamous, heterosexual union concede that in
order for the institution to contribute to the morality of society, the
institution must actually work. 216 In other words, for marriage to
strengthen the moral foundation of society, those unions
recognized as legal marriages must be permanent, monogamous,
211. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text (discussing the over- and
under-inclusive nature of benefit distribution through marriage).
212. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 126.
213. See Hager, supra note 127, at 570 (noting that the "battle cry" of the
Louisiana legislature in enacting the Covenant Marriage Act of that state was
"strengthening marriage").
214. See, e.g., infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text (discussing a meritbased system of benefit distribution).
215. Compare Bradley, supra note 3, at 748 (arguing that marriage is morally
superior to other relationships because of the ability of the married couple to
perform "reproductive-type acts" within the marriage), with Chai R. Feldblum,
Constructing Family, Constructing Change: Shifting Legal Perspectives on SameSex Relationships:Religion, Morality and Sexuality: A Progressive Moral Case for
Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 485, 493 (1998) (questioning
whether marriage actually contributes a "moral good" to society).
216. See generally Collett, supra note 178 (addressing the status of individuals
who divorce and then remarry during the lifetime of their prior spouse, stating that
"the people in those marriages are recognized in the law, but that's not taken to be
legal repudiation of the moral and theological beliefs of, for example, Catholics who
hold the position of the Church").
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and heterosexual. 217 Yet, individuals can marry, reap the benefits
of marriage, and then break the marital vows without incurring
the stigma of divorce simply by choosing not to divorce. For
example, individuals can fail to be monogamous by committing
adultery. They can even fail to be heterosexual, yet remain
married. 218 Even if a marriage fails, individuals can mitigate their
damages by re-marrying and re-achieving the legal and social
status of marriage as many times as they wish.219 This ability to
string together permanent, monogamous unions makes each union
non-permanent.
If permanent, monogamous unions deserve
reward for their contribution to the morality of society, then
society should reward permanent, monogamous unions, not
marriages.220
D. THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION
With the exception of the social status that accompanies
marriage and the social stigma that accompanies being unmarried,
221
many of the benefits and protections of marriage are economic.
Many economic benefits resulting from marriage relate to the
federal income tax system. While the so-called "marriage penalty"
217. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 731-32 (contending that the "moral truth [is]
that a valid marriage is indissoluble" and monogamous). See also Legal Claims for
Same-Sex Marriage,supra note 40, at 750 ('CThe legal status of marriage has been
reserved exclusively for special covenant heterosexual unions because those unions
are unique and uniquely beneficial.").
218. See United States v. Phillips, 52 M.J. 268 (C.A.A.F. 2000). In Phillips, the
defendant married in order to receive military benefits that would allow him to live
in civilian housing with his male partner. Id. at 269. It also appears that the
defendant's legal wife and his partner's legal wife may have been involved in a
lesbian relationship. Id. at 271. See also RGM v. DEM, 410 S.E.2d 564, 565 (S.C.
1991) Tthe respondent attempted to salvage his marriage despite the fact that his
wife was having an extra-marital affair with a woman. Id.
219. Most states have statutes similar to that of either Massachusetts or
Minnesota. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 24 (2002) ('After a judgment of divorce
has become absolute, either party may marry again as if the other were dead.");
MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2001) ("A marriage entered into before the dissolution of an
earlier marriage of one of the parties becomes final" is prohibited). These statutes
effectively prohibit bigamy, but not infinite re-marriages. See id.
220. As noted, this is not currently the case. See supra note 218 and infra notes
68-82 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which according benefits to
marital status unjustifiably rewards some relationships and unjustifiably denies
benefits and protections to others).
221. See generally GAO Report, supra note 68, at 1-3 (describing the ways in
which various federal statues economically benefit married couples). For example,
"[t]he surviving spouse of a public safety officer killed in the line of duty is eligible
for a death benefit of up to $100,000." Id. at 5. The United States Code also
contains laws "that provide for continuation of employer-sponsored health benefits
after events like the death or divorce of the employee; and that give employees the
right to unpaid leave in order to care for a seriously ill spouse." Id.
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and "marriage bonus" cause unmarried individuals to benefit more
than their married counterparts in one instance and extract less
from the U.S. Treasury in the other, 222 when considered
simultaneously with the provisions below, the federal income tax
system treats many married couples markedly better than
223
similarly situated unmarried individuals.
For example, unmarried couples may not transfer property
between themselves without incurring tax consequences. 224 Yet
"[t]he law permits transfers of property from one spouse to another
(or to a former spouse if the transfer is incident to a divorce)
225
without any recognition of gain or loss for tax purposes."
Additionally, "[g]ifts from one spouse to a third party are deemed
to be from both spouses equally." 226 Together, "[t]hese provisions
permit married couples to transfer substantial sums to one
another, and to third parties, without tax liability in
circumstances in which single people would not enjoy the same
privilege. 227
Moreover, "[flor estate tax purposes, property
transferred to one spouse as the result of the death of another is
deductible for purposes of determining the value of the decedent's
estate."

2 28

Therefore, while all U.S. taxpayers share the financial
burden of maintaining the Republic, the individuals in one readily

222. See Dorothy A. Brown, The MarriageBonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65
U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 789 (1997) (stating that "[t]he marriage penalty is greatest

when a total household income is split equally between the spouses," and that the
"marriage bonus is greatest when total household income is earned by only one
wage earner").
223. See Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code,
34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465, 467 (2000) (noting that "approximately half the married
couples filing tax returns report bonuses and half report penalties") (citing the
Cong. Budget Office, 105th Cong., For Better or for Worse: Marriage and the
Federal Income Tax, 31 tbl.5 (1997)). The so-called "marriage penalty" and
"marriage bonus" may represent the most controversial and debated interfaces
between the federal income tax system and marriage. Despite all of the analysis,
the precise economic effect the combination marriage and taxes will have on a
couple depends on the economic position of the couple. See Ann F. Thomas, Forum
on Married Women and the Income Tax: MarriagePenalties and Marriage Bonuses
of the 105th Congress: Observing Money, Marriageand Taxation, 16 N.Y.L.SCH. J.
Therefore, married couples whose financial
HuM. RTS. 127, 153-59 (1999).
situation allows and encourages them to utilize these provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code experience the benefits of marriage related to taxation most acutely.
By the same reasoning, unmarried couples in the same financial position will
experience this disparity in treatment, and exemplify this inequality, most acutely.
224. See GAO Report, supra note 68, at 4.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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identifiable group, married people, receive significantly better
treatment for the purpose of taxation than the individuals in
As
another readily identifiable group - unmarried people.
do
not
two
groups
these
within
individuals
similarly situated
contribute more or less to the Republic by virtue of their marital
status alone, the state cannot justify these differences in

treatment. 229
During the DOMA debates, the fact that all taxpayers
contribute financially to married couples was foremost in the
minds of many Congress members. For example, Representative
Barr claimed that without DOMA, Congress would have no choice
but to "throw open the doors of the U.S. Treasury to be raided by
the homosexual movement."230 Representatives Weldon 231 and
Lipinski 232 supported this implication by essentially stating that,
should the federal government or any number of states recognize
same-sex marriages, these couples would receive money
contributed to the U.S. Treasury by all Americans. Yet the
current system of taxation obligates unmarried individuals to pay
for the economic benefits married couples receive. Therefore, the
legal institution of marriage "throws open the doors of the U.S.
Treasury to be raided" 233 by married people.
Ultimately, this certain amplification of the unfairness
inherent in the current institution of marriage with respect to
same-sex couples failed to prevent DOMA from becoming law. 234
The DOMA debate did, however, bring to light numerous economic
facts that call the value and validity of marriage into question, not
only as an exclusively opposite-sex institution, but as a legal
institution at all.
Justifying the economic benefits of marriage with the social
contributions of marriage begs the question of whether marriage
actually achieves its purported social goals. If marriage fails to
achieve those goals, and the goals are legitimate, then society
should find an alternative to marriage that will successfully

229. See Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law &
Economics Defense of Same-Sex Marriage,22 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 115, 137 (2001)
(suggesting that under a law and economics analysis, same-sex marriages may be
economically beneficial to society).
230. Supra note 141, 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7488 (statement of Rep. Barr).
231. Supra note 141, 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7493 (statement of Rep. Weldon).
232. Supra note 141, 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7495 (statement of Rep. Lipinski).
233. Supra note 141, 142 CONG. REC. H7480, H7488 (statement of Rep. Barr).
234. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
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achieve those goals. 235 The alternative of abolishing marriage and
instead evaluating the social contributions of any given
relationship or individual is much more closely related to the
achievement of specific social goals. 236 Under such a system, the
state would provide or deny a couple or individual the economic
rewards currently afforded marriage based on the merits and
achievements of the relationship or the individual.2 37 A system
granting economic benefits according to the actual social
contribution of an individual or couple would not only encourage
achievement of the social benefits of marriage, but would grant the
benefits to those most deserving. 238 As a merit-based system
would accomplish the goals of marriage and distribute the
economic benefits more accurately and equitably than the current
system of marriage, such a system is superior to the current
institution of marriage. Thus, society should eliminate marriage
239
and replace it with such a system.
E. THE TRADITION JUSTIFICATION- 'TRADITION,
TRADITION!"40
The comments of various members of Congress during the
DOMA debates exemplify the misconception that marriage
consisting of one man and one woman is the American marital
American tradition with respect to marriage,
tradition. 241
however, turns on how one defines tradition. 242 One way to define
235. See infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
a merit-based system of benefit distribution),
236. See infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text.
238. Case law confirms that numerous unmarried couples achieve the cited social
goals and benefits of marriage to at least some degree. See, e.g., Irizarry v. Bd. of
Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that the unmarried plaintiff
"lived with the same man for more than two decades and they have two (now adult)
children"). See also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867-68 (Vt. 1999) (describing the
level of commitment and length of the relationships of the same-sex plaintiffs
before the court). See also Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 431-32 (W. Va. 1990)
(reciting plaintiffs apparently uncontroverted allegation that she and her male
partner pooled their assets, lived together for twenty-eight years, begat and raised
four children together, and held themselves out as married despite the lack of a
valid marriage license).
239. See infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of
a merit-based system of benefit distribution).
240. Jerry Bock and Sheldon Harnick, Tradition FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (1965).
241. See supra notes 139 (quoting Congress members' arguments regarding
tradition in favor of DOMA).
242. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Reason, Tradition, and Family Law: A
Comment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA- L. REV. 1515, 1529-33 (1993)
(discussing the relativism and interpretations necessary for arguments made
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the tradition of marriage in America is the systematic elimination
of all other forms of unions. 243 In Cleveland v.United States,244 the
Supreme Court upheld, over vigorous dissent, the criminal
conviction of Mormon defendants under the Mann Act 245 for
"transport[ing] at least one plural wife across state lines, either for
the purpose of cohabiting with her," or so that another married
individual could cohabitate with her. 246 After Cleveland, the
practice of any form of polyamorous relationship would likely
receive similar treatment. Similarly, consanguineous marriages
were legal in most states 247 until banned by statute. 248 Further,
state legislatures across the country passed "mini-DOMAs"
limiting marriage to opposite-sex unions in order to head-off
potential attempts by same-sex couples to enter into legal
249
marriages.
regarding tradition and suggesting that "a better interpretation of our marital
tradition is as the provision of social support for those who wish to make a
commitment to emotional interdependence").
243. See CO'IT, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that throughout early American history
those in power "endorsed and aimed to perpetuate nationally a particular marriage
model: lifelong, faithful monogamy, formed by the mutual consent of a man and a
woman, bearing the impress of the Christian religion and the English common
law"). Under this model, the expectation was "for the husband to be the family
head and economic provider, his wife the dependent partner." Id.
244. 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 398 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000)).
246. Cleveland, 329 U.S. at 16.
247. See, e.g., Weisberg v. Weisberg, 112 A.D. 231, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906)
(refusing to grant the Weisbergs a divorce on the "bald fact that [Mrs. Weisberg's]
husband is her uncle" because "[m]arriages between uncles and nieces are now
prohibited, but they were not prohibited until after" the Weisbergs were married).
248. See, e.g.,.Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.020 (1978) ('All marriages between parents
and children, including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree, between
brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, between uncles and
nieces, aunts and nephews, [and] first cousins ...are prohibited and declared
absolutely void.").
249. Most state laws expressly defining marriage as an exclusively opposite-sex
institution. See ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie
2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie 2001);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 101 (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. §
572-1 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 2001); § 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/213.1 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101
(2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.045 (Michie 2001); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89
(West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 701 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271 (West 2001); MINN.
STAT. § 517.03 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022
(2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 122.020 (2001);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 457,2 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE, § 14-03-01 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3101.01 (West 2001); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 51 § 255 (2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-115 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-38 (Mischie 2001); TENN. CODE

2003]

QUESTIONING THE MARRIAGE ASSUMPTIONS

155

If forcing all members of society to maintain a single form of
relationship that some consider the "ideal" demonstrates tradition
worthy of preservation, then marriage should continue as a legal
institution consisting of a single member of each sex, and society
250
should prevent and repudiate all other forms of unions.
However, such a course of action will either force assimilation of
minority groups into the dominant culture, 25 1 perpetuate
inequality, 25 2 or both. Therefore, such a course of action is ill
advised, and society should avoid it.
Alternatively, one may consider American marital tradition
as the expanding and contracting of marriage consistent with
changes in social values. 253 Loving v. Virginia254 showcases the
beauty of this tradition. In Loving, the Supreme Court struck
down a Virginia statute criminalizing interracial marriages. 255
ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-1-2 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 8 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2
(Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603
(2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (Michie 2001). The states of Alaska and
Hawaii also amended their Constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriages. ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 25 (2001); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (2001). Nebraska amended its
constitution to expressly delegate the authority to prohibit same-sex marriages to
the legislature. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (2001).

250. See, e.g., Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 40 (contending
that only unions between one man and one woman can make a marriage, as only
these unions have been historically recognized).
251. Perhaps those opposing same-sex marriage believe that limiting the most
privileged and protected places in society to individuals in legal marriages, and
then limiting legal marriages to opposite-sex couples will cause individuals to
"choose" heterosexuality, or at least an outward appearance thereof. Or perhaps
opposite-sex only advocates believe that the limitation of marriage to heterosexuals
combined with considerable social pressure to marry will "cure" homosexuals.
Consideration of these possibilities is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
the sheer number of individuals who identify as GLBT despite the degree and
extent of homophobia, discrimination, violence, hate-speech, and social pressure to
the contrary (as evidenced by multiple citations within this Article) strongly
implies that if such beliefs exist, they are ill-founded.
252. See supra notes 123-135 and accompanying text (discussing the inequality
inherent in caste systems like that created by marriage and which same-sex
marriage would perpetuate).
253. The idea of evolving social institutions alongside social values is observable
in other contexts as well. As stated in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.:
Moral philosophers may debate whether certain inequalities are absolute
wrongs, but history makes clear that constitutional principles of equality,
like constitutional principles of liberty, property, and due process, evolve
over time; what once was a "natural" and "self-evident" ordering later
comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human
potential and freedom.
473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
254. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
255. Id. at 12.
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The Supreme Court quoted the following paragraph from the
opinion of the trial court that convicted the Lovings under
Virginia's miscegenation statute: "Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on
And but for the interference with his
separate continents.
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages." 256 The
parallel between this statement and the phrase "Adam and Eve,
not Adam and Steve," often recited by those condemning
homosexuality, and assumedly same-sex marriages, is all too
clear. 25 7 Historically and currently, Americans use a human
determination of God's will to justify their prejudices. 258 Initially,
the law reflected these prejudices. 259 As society evolves, these
justifications become either unbelievable or unpersuasive.260
Subsequently, the law changes to reflect the new social perception
of what is just.26 1 More recent examples of this tradition include
263
and civil unions. 264
no-fault divorces, 262 covenant marriages

256. Id. at 3.
257. See, e.g., Geoff Dutton, Gay People Show Their Pride at Parade, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 30, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, AllNews
File (reporting that anti-gay protesters at a gay pride parade carried a sign reciting
this phrase). See also supra note 171 and accompanying text (Roger D. Willis
arguing that "it's Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve," and therefore states should
prohibit same-sex marriages and any education that portrays homosexual
relationships in a positive light).
258. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the trial court in Loving v. Virginia
which claimed miscegenation laws maintained the will of God that people of
different races would not intermingle); Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *13
(February 15, 2002) ("Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent,
immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature
and of nature's God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated.") (Moore,
C.J., specially concurring).
259. As an example, consider the legal prohibition on marriages between slaves
prior to abolition. See COIT, supra note 7, at 4. The miscegenation statutes
common in the states before Loving are additional examples. Id. Time will tell
whether history will view the "mini-DOMAs" codified in the laws of many states in
the same light. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (listing the "miniDOMAs" of many states).
260. See, e.g., Vermont's, An Act Related to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 91. See also infra note 264 and accompanying text. While Vermont's law
does not recognize same-sex marriages, such a law was inconceivable twenty years
ago.
261. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (upholding a
Louisiana statute that provided separate but equal accommodations in railroad
cars for members of different races), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954). See also State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (1871) (holding that
Indiana's miscegenation statute was constitutional because "neither the fourteenth
amendment nor the civil rights bill has impaired or abrogated the laws of this State
on the subject of marriage of whites and negroes"), impliedly overruled by Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
262. See Ellman & Lohr, supra note 18, at 722-23 (contrasting no-fault divorces
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As shown above, American marital tradition evolves parallel
An intellectually rigorous and unflinching
to social values.
evaluation of current American society and the legal institution of
marriage shows society's evolution such that marriage is now
socially undesirable. Thus, under the analysis above, American
marital tradition dictates the abolition of marriage because: (1)
marriage fails to accomplish social goals and society would more
efficiently accomplish these goals through other means; and (2)
marriage creates inequality that we should now recognize as
unjustifiable.

with classic full-fault divorces). Under a full-fault divorce system a state will not
grant a divorce "except on the petition of an 'innocent' spouse who could prove the
other spouse guilty of marital misconduct." Id. While the exact requirements vary
from state to state, under a generalized no-fault system, "either spouse [can]
terminate the marriage unilaterally" and without showing fault on the part of the
other spouse. Id. See also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the
Year in Family Law: A Search for Definitions and Policy, 31 FAM. L.Q. 613, 663
tbl.4 (1998) (showing that each of the fifty states have some form of no-fault divorce
provision).
263. See, e.g., Covenant Marriage Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272-75 (West
2002) (allowing couples to choose to enter into, or change their current marriage to,
a covenant marriage). In order to enter into a covenant marriage individuals must
provide the state with a notarized "declaration of intent" to enter into a covenant
marriage. Id. Couples opting for a covenant marriage legally commit themselves
"to take all reasonable efforts to preserve [their] marriage, including marital
counseling." § 9:273.1(A).
264. A civil union is a legal status distinct from that of marriage but that
ostensibly confer the same statutory benefits and protections upon civilly united
couples and married couples. See, e.g., An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 91 (creating "civil unions" for same-sex couples). Same-sex couples
that enter into civil unions receive the same treatment as married couples under
applicable Vermont statutes. Id. However, a civilly united couple is not legally
married. Id. How states without civil union laws will treat civilly united couples
on the whole remains to be seen. However, the first few cases to address the issue
confirm the fears of commentators who indicated that outside of the state in which
a couple is civilly united, the legal status of a civil union would be meaningless.
See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 174-84 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)
(affirming dismissal of plaintiffs petition for a dissolution of his civil union for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because the trial court only had jurisdiction over

marriages and a civil union is not a marriage under Vermont and Connecticut law).
See also Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the

Full-Faith and Credit Clause did not require Georgia to recognize a civil union as a
marriage, as a civil union is not a marriage under Vermont law). The Rosengarten
court went on to state that even if a civil union were a marriage under Vermont

law, the Georgia statute limits marriages in Georgia to one man and one woman
and would render a Vermont same-sex marriage void in Georgia. Rosengarten,802
A.2d at 174-84.
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F. MARRIAGE AS A NECESSITY FOR THE SURVIVAL
OF THE SPECIES- "SHEBLINDED ME WITH
SCIENCE!'2 65
In addition to the purported economic, moral, and sociological
benefits of exclusively opposite-sex marriage with respect to
children, proponents of marriage also attempt to justify their
position with biology. 266 The would-be biological argument that
marriage ensures the survival of the human race is less persuasive
than any of the other "opposite sex marriage only" arguments.
The claim that marriage ensures procreation and survival of the
268
267
and basic biology. 269
species ignores history, current fact,
Marriage is not necessary for reproduction as humans
reproduced long before the legal institution of marriage 270 and
currently reproduce outside of marriage with considerable
efficiency. 27' Additionally, the human being is the only known
species with a legal system. Marriage is, by definition, a legal
institution. 272 Yet, all species reproduce. Furthermore, not all
married couples are capable of reproduction, 273 and not all couples

265. THOMAS DOLBY, She Blinded Me With Science, on THE GOLDEN AGE OF
WIRELESS (Capitol Records 1982).
266. Professor Wardle claims the "social interest[s] in responsible procreation"
support the contention that marriage should continue as a purely opposite-sex
institution. Multiply and Replenish, supra note 38, at 781-82. Wardle goes on to
claim, "The first social interest in responsible procreation is the perpetuation of
New generations must be
human society: survival through reproduction.
procreated if any society is to continue, and human procreation requires the union
of male and female." Id. at 783.
267. RICHARD G. KLIEN & BLAKE EDGAR, THE DAWN OF HuMAN CULTURE 224

(2002). Klien and Edgar report fossil evidence indicates that modern humans,
Homo sapien sapien, first existed in Africa 90,000 to 120,000 years ago. The
earliest known written records of a marriage ritual, on the other hand, are those of
the early Sumerians. WOMEN'S EARLIEST RECORDS: FROM ANCIENT EGYPT AND
WESTERN ASIA 75-77 (Barbara Lesko ed. 1987). Archeologists approximate the
Sumerians lived during the third-millennium B.C., or 5000 to 6000 years ago. Id.
at 71. Therefore, physical evidence suggests that modern humans existed and
reproduced without marriage for at least 85,000 years.
268. See Thornton, supra note 157, at 595 (noting that "about one child in four is
now born outside of marriage") (citing the Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Pub.
Health Serv., Monthly Vital Statistics Report 39, 4 Advance Report of Final
Natality Statistics, 1988 (1990)).

269. See Perrin, supra note 179, at 341 C'The desire for children is a basic human
instinct and satisfies many people's wish to leave a mark on history or perpetuate
their family's story.").
270. See supranote 267 and accompanying text.
271. See Thornton, supra note 157, at 595 and accompanying text.
272. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 43.

273. See Thornton, supra note 157, at 595 and accompanying text.
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capable of reproduction are married. 274 If a primary objective of
marriage is reproduction, then the state should deny marriage
licenses to couples that cannot reproduce. 275 Similarly, the legal
marriages of fertile couples should automatically terminate when
276
the couple is no longer capable of reproduction.
If the procreative potential of a union is what society
rewards, then society should accord the greatest rewards to those
unions with the greatest procreative potential. 277 While same-sex
couples cannot currently blend their genetic material and create
another life from their union, same-sex couples do have children
through prior relationships, alternative insemination, adoption,
and as surrogate parents. 278 Similarly, single individuals both gay
and straight adopt, bear, and raise children through alternative
insemination, unplanned pregnancy, tragedy, divorce, and
choice. 279 Therefore, if couples that procreate and raise children
deserve the benefits of marriage, then same-sex couples,
unmarried opposite-sex couples, and single individuals who
engage in these activities deserve the benefits married couples
274. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999). The Baker court noted that
"many opposite-sex couples marry for reasons unrelated to procreation, that some
of these couples never intend to have children, and that others are incapable of
having children." Id.
275. See id. at 882 (stating that "it is undisputed that most of those who utilize
nontraditional means of conception are infertile marriedcouples").
276. See id. at 881. The Baker court concluded that with respect to the goal of
procreation, Vermont's law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples "extends the
benefits and protections of marriage to many persons with no logical connection to
the stated governmental goal." Id.
277. A skeletal picture of such a system includes the determination and
quantification of the value of the certain acts and processes. For example, in order
to distribute rewards in proportion to achievement, society would have to
determine whether child bearing is more valuable than, less valuable than, or
equally as valuable as, child rearing. Once society made such a determination,
society would need to quantify the acts accordingly in order to accurately distribute
the benefits to, as examples, adoptive parents, natural parents, surrogate mothers,
and foster parents. Similarly, in order to reward scientists performing in vitro
fertilization and cloning, surrogate mothers, natural parents, accidental and
unplanned pregnancies resulting from chance encounters, and pregnancies within
committed relationships, society would have to rank and quantify the acts of child
bearing, combining genetic material to create a new life, and combining genetic
material to create a new life within a committed, monogamous relationship. This
exemplifies the complication and subtleties implementation of such a system would
require, and displays the ineffective nature of marriage to truly achieve this goal.
Marriage is far too simple a system to fairly and justly accomplish the objective of
rewarding procreation and procreative potential because marriage observes no such
subtleties and makes no reasonable distinctions. See supra notes 266-269.
278. See Perrin, supra note 179, at 341-42. While gay and lesbian couples also
act as foster parents, this activity is not mentioned as it is conceptually distinct
from the more permanent activities listed.
279. See id.
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receive.
As perpetuation of the institution of marriage denies
unmarried childbearing and childrearing individuals the benefits
and protections accorded married couples, the legal institution of
marriage discourages unmarried individuals from having children.
Some would say that is exactly the point. However, if society is
concerned with the possibility of extinction, then society should
encourage every capable individual to reproduce with or without
marriage. Distributing benefits via marriage and stigmatizing
single parents and their children encourages only certain members
Thus, justifying marriage and the
of society to reproduce.
provision of benefits according to marital status with the state's
interest in the survival of the species is inherently contradictory.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO MARRIAGE
Abolition of marriage raises the question of what would
replace the instantaneous vesting of rights and responsibilities
that currently occurs upon marriage. 28 0 Immediate possibilities
include contracts, property law, tort law, and criminal law. 28 ' In
other words, couples would simply rely upon the laws utilized to
govern and regulate most other interactions between people,
280. See, e.g., Baker, 744 A-2d at 883.
[Tihe benefits and protections incident to a marriage license under
include, for example, the right to receive a portion of the
Vermont law ...
estate of a spouse who dies intestate and protection against disinheritance
through elective share provisions, under 14 V.S.A. §§ 401-404, 551;
preference in being appointed as the personal representative of a spouse
who dies intestate, under 14 V.S.A. § 903; the right to bring a lawsuit for
the wrongful death of a spouse, under 14 V.S.A. § 1492; the right to bring
an action for loss of consortium, under 12 V.S.A. § 5431; the right to
workers' compensation survivor benefits under 21 V.S.A. § 632; the right to
spousal benefits statutorily guaranteed to public employees, including
health, life, disability, and accident insurance, under 3 V.S.A. § 631; the
opportunity to be covered as a spouse under group life insurance policies
issued to an employee, under 8 V.S.A. § 3811; the opportunity to be
covered as the insured's spouse under an individual health insurance
policy, under 8 V.S.A. § 4063; the right to claim an evidentiary privilege for
marital communications, under V.R.E. 504; homestead rights and
protections, under 27 V.S.A. §§ 105-108, 141-142; the presumption of joint
ownership of property and the concomitant right of survivorship, under 27
V.S.A. § 2; hospital visitation and other rights incident to the medical
treatment of a family member, under 18 V.S.A. § 1852; and the right to
receive, and the obligation to provide, spousal support, maintenance, and
property division in the event of separation or divorce, under 15 V.S.A. §§
751-752.
Id.
281. See FINEMAN, supra note 112, at 229-30 (noting that after the abolition of
marriage, children would remain "protected by incest [laws] and other laws, and
rape would continue to be subject to criminal sanctions" and suggesting the
abolition of marriage and replacement thereof with contracts).
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instead of the default of marriage. In such a system, "[w]omen
and men would operate outside of the confines of marriage,
transacting and interacting without the fetters of legalities they
282
did not voluntarily choose."
A. CONTRACTS
The development of alternatives to marriage such as civil
unions, no-fault divorces, and covenant marriages indicates that
Americans greatly desire the ability to choose the nature and
extent of their intimate relationships. 283 Instead of the additional
social stratification these options create, society should abolish
marriage and replace it with contracts. While marriage does
contain elements of contract, such as mutual consent and
reciprocal promises, marriage also differs from a contract in that
the state defines a number of the terms and obligations of the
parties within a marriage. 284 As such, the parties entering into
the status of marriage are not free to define its terms or scope.
This constriction limits the choices and freedom of the individuals
within marriage. 285 Abolishing marriage and replacing it with
contracts would lift this limitation on the ability of individuals to
freely negotiate their rights, remedies, obligations, and degree of
commitment with respect to their intimate relationships.
Currently, couples can employ contracts in the form of
prenuptial, or antenuptual, agreements to circumvent many of the
negative aspects of marriage. 286 Prenuptial agreements refine and
express the scope and extent of the rights and obligations of the
individuals within a marriage. 287 However, these agreements still
fail to give the parties to a marriage complete control over the
relationship because the State still defines many of the aspects of
marriage. 288 By replacing marriage with contracts, the individuals

282. Id. at 229.
283. See supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text (describing the
particularities of these marital alternatives).
284. See Fineman, supra note 14, at 260 ("[A]lthough one may have 'choice' when
entering marriage, when it comes to the terms and consequences of that status,
there is no free marketplace in which private ordering is the rule.").
285. See FINEMAN, supra note 112, at 228-30 (implying that the "special legal
rules governing the relationships between husband and wife or defining the
consequences of the status of marriage" limits of the freedom of married individuals
to define their relationship).
286. See id. at 229 ("We already encourage antenuptual agreements that are
contractual deviations from state-imposed marriage consequences.").
287. Id.
288. See Fineman, supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the
limitations of contractual agreements in marriages).
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entering into agreements that are similar to prenuptial
agreements would contract for every provision of their
relationship, instead of negotiating only the specific provisions of
marriage the state allows them to adjust when combining
statutory marriage and a prenuptial agreement. 289
Using
contractual agreements to govern all relationships would fill the
gaps the abolition of marriage would create. Also, it would give
individuals considerably more control over their rights and
obligations both within, and upon the termination of, their
intimate relationships. 290 Marriage is thus unnecessary because
contract law is an adequate and preferable substitute for the legal
29 1
securities and recourses currently ensured by marriage.
B. STATUTORYAND

COMMON LAW

Ideally, all individuals would have access to the legal means
and resources to create complex contracts. However, economics
prevent such a reality. Therefore, if society truly has an interest
in accomplishing the stated goals of marriage, then it should do so
through statutes and common law. In some instances, laws of this
nature are already functioning. 292 Expanding these laws to
include the non-biological parent in same-sex relationships where
the couple bears and raises a child through mutual consent would
further the social interest of protecting children economically by
protecting the children of same-sex couples to the same extent as
293
the children of opposite-sex couples.

289. FINEMAN, supra note 112, at 229.
290. Id. In describing the result of replacing marriage with contracts, Fineman
notes, "Women and men would operate outside of the confines of marriage,
transacting and interacting without the fetters of legalities they did not voluntarily
choose." Id.
291. Id. at 229. In suggesting the abolition of legal marriage, Fineman argues,
"Opportunities for individual bargaining about economic and other aspects of
sexual relations typically now occur at the termination of the relationship" but that
abolishing marriage and replacing the legal status with contracts "would merely
mandate that such bargaining occur prior to the termination of the relationship."
Id.
292. For example, in order to help prevent poverty for unmarried women and
their children, general laws mandate child support from the non-custodial oppositesex parent in opposite-sex relationships. See Nat'l Women's Law Center, supra
note 201, at 368 (citing § 402(a)(2) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 602(a)(2),
requiring states to provide assistance to individuals in enforcing child support as a
precursor to receiving federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families funding).
293. Some courts recognize this principle and grant the non-biological parent in
failed same-sex relationships the same rights and responsibilities as parents in
failed opposite-sex relationships. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (Pa. 2000)
(granting visitation to the non-biological parent in a failed lesbian relationship).
Accord T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001). But cf. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572
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In abolishing marriage, the statutory intestacy laws would
also require a revision that is long overdue. 294 Currently, intestacy
laws distribute the assets of a deceased individual in accord with
the unstated assumption that an individual with a committed
295
Following
intimate partner can, and will, marry that partner.
this assumption, intestacy laws take spouses into account but not
committed unmarried partners. 296 As large numbers of Americans
297
do in fact have a committed, intimate, yet unmarried partner,
the current structure of these laws does not accurately reflect the
donative intent of these individuals. 298 Thus, revision of these
laws would not only more accurately reflect the donative intent of
these individuals, but would also economically protect and provide
for the surviving partner in these relationships in ways marriage
299
cannot since marriage is unavailable to many of these couples.
C. EVALUATION OF THE MERITS
Another option for the distribution of benefits is to accord
benefits based on the needs and/or virtues of the individual
If society decides some goals are so critically
relationship.
important as to warrant encouragement with a system of rewards,
then society should reward the couples or individuals that actually
accomplish them. According the benefits of marriage to couples
that fail to achieve the purported goals of marriage - the goals
N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (rejecting petitioner's request of a writ of habeas corpus
for visitation even though together, plaintiff and defendant, a former lesbian
couple, "planned for the conception and birth of the child and agreed to share
jointly all rights and responsibilities of child-rearing" and the parties did in-fact
jointly raise the child both emotionally and economically for a total of six years).
294. See generally Mary Louise Fellows, et al., Committed Partners and
Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 15-31 (1998) (reporting that
intestacy laws to not accurately reflect the donative intent of a considerable portion
of the population).
295. See id. at 13 (discussing the intent of the structure of intestacy laws and
noting that "for the purposes of intestacy, [family] has meant a married couple and
children of the marriage").
296. See id. at 14. Under prevailing statutory law, the surviving committed
intimate partner does not share in the decedent's intestate estate. See id. The
property of the decedent passes to the decedent's lineal descendants or next of kin.
See id. at 15.
297. See id. at 3 ("In 1994, approximately 7% of the nation's couples were in
unmarried committed relationships.").
298. Id. at 89 (observing that, contrary to the distribution of the estate of an
unmarried individual in a committed, intimate relationship under the intestacy
statutes, in an empirical study a substantial majority of individuals in committed,
intimate yet unmarried, relationships "preferred the partner to take a share of the
decedent's estate").
299. See id. at 3 (reporting that in 1994 the number of households likely to be
headed by same-sex couples was approximately 1.7 million).
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that supposedly justify the benefits of marriage - creates a social
cost, without the social benefit that assumedly justifies that cost.
In other words, married couples receive benefits on the
assumption that their marriage achieves social goals. Society
never validates that assumption, however. For instance, on the
assumption that monogamous unions are superior to nonmonogamous unions, society restricts marriages to monogamous
unions by prohibiting polygamy. 3°° Society then provides married
couples benefits in order to encourage people to marry and, thus,
enter into monogamous unions.3"' However, society provides the
benefits regardless of whether the couple actually remains
monogamous. As long as the couple remains married the benefits
continue. As long as the marital status remains unchanged,
society pays, even if the couple fails to accomplish the goals for
which society is paying.
Additionally, numerous same-sex couples and unmarried
02
opposite-sex couples achieve the social goals of marriage.
Consider the social goal of child rearing. "Estimates of the number
of children who are being raised in gay or lesbian families in the
United States range from six million to fourteen million,"30 3 and
"[slingle-parent families now constitute twenty-six percent of all
families with minor children and are the most rapidly growing
family form in America. ''3°4 By raising children, members of these
groups are accomplishing at least one of the goals that ostensibly
justify the benefits of marriage. Therefore, society should provide
the marital benefits to these individuals. A merit-based system of
benefit distribution would assure these families receive the
benefits and protections they deserve.
Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner describes a merit-based
system system in the context of the revision of intestacy laws.0 5
In order to divide the estates of unmarried individuals who die
intestate consistent with the presumed donative intent of these
individuals, °6 Waggoner suggests determining whether a

300. See supra notes 243-246 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., supra note 238 (listing cases involving unmarried couples who
achieved at least some of the ostensible goals of marriage).
303. Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEv.
1025, 1026 (1992).
304. Dowd, supra note 182, at 21.
305. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L.
REV. 21, 79-80 (1994).
306. See id. at 29-34 (discussing the demographic characteristics of persons dying
intestate).
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30 7
surviving individual is a "de facto partner" of the decedent.
Waggoner's suggestions show that an evaluation of the virtues of
any given relationship is not only possible, but desirable.
Waggoner's "de facto partner" considerations outline a system in
which the evaluation of the merits, structure, and social
contributions of individuals and relationships would determine the
extent to which society rewarded the relationship or individual
with the benefits currently linked to marriage.0 8
Admittedly, the specifics and administration of such a system
would be complex. However, such a system would ultimately
ensure that only those couples achieving social goals receive the
various benefits provided in exchange for the achievement of those
goals. Thus, society would actually receive the benefits currently
paid for through provision of marital benefits. This contrasts the
current system wherein society pays by providing marital benefits
regardless of whether a couple actually achieves the goals for
which society pays. Additionally, it would ensure that all couples
achieving society's objectives receive the benefits they deserve.

CONCLUSION
Marriage is a legal institution with no clear definition.
Nevertheless, the legal status of "married" confers upon those
within the status considerable, yet unjustifiable, benefits. As the
benefits and preferred status of "married" are unjustified,
existence of the legal institution of marriage creates unjustifiable
social inequality. Marriage also fails to achieve the social goals
and interests that purists offer in its support and in support of the
provision of benefits to the legal status of "married." While this is

307. Id. at 79. To make such determinations Waggoner suggests courts consider:
(1) [Ihe purpose, duration, constancy, and exclusivity of the relationship;
(2) the degree to which the parties pooled their financial resources, such as
by maintaining joint checking or other types of accounts, sharing a
mortgage or lease on the household in which they lived or on other
property, titling the household in which they lived or other property in
joint tenancy, or naming the other as primary beneficiary of life insurance
or employee benefit plans;
(3) the procreation or adoption of children and the degree of mutual care
and support given them;
(4) whether the couple went through a marriage ceremony; and
(5) the degree to which the couple held themselves out to others as married
or the degree to which the couple held themselves out to others as
emotionally and financially committed to one another on a permanent
basis, as exhibited by their acknowledging mutual rights, duties, and
obligation toward one another.
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especially true with respect to marriage as a purely opposite-sex
institution, it is also true with respect to the existence of legal
marriage at all.
If society truly needs and desires the
accomplishment of certain goals and interests, society should
accomplish these goals and interests through other means such as
contracts, statutes, and common law.
Similarly, if society
determines that individuals require incentive to achieve certain
social goals, then society should distribute the benefits currently
accorded the legal status of "married" proportionally to the success
of an individual or relationship in achieving the stated social
goals.
The creation of alternative legal institutions such as "civil
unions" and "domestic partnerships" only serve to accentuate and
perpetuate the social inequality inherent when multiple social
statuses exist, but society prefers one to all others and limits
entrance into that status to members of a certain group.
Similarly, same-sex marriages would also perpetuate inequality
between married and unmarried individuals and couples.
Therefore, in order to achieve true social equality society should
work for the abolition of the legal institution and privileged status
of marriage.

